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Evans: What Makes You So Special?: Ending the Credit Rating Agencies' S

Notes
WHAT MAKES YOU SO SPECIAL?:
ENDING THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES’
SPECIAL STATUS AND ACCESS TO
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
“The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of a colossal
failure. . . . The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk . . . .”1
In the words of a famous presidential advisor, “Never waste a good
crisis.”2 The financial markets crisis that began in the second half of 2007
and surged into a full-blown maelstrom in 2008 is certainly one not to be
wasted.3 This crisis can be traced to the 2006 bursting of the housing
bubble, which triggered the collapse of the subprime mortgage market.4
Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) [hereinafter CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing] (statement of
Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) (discussing
the role played by the three leading credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
and Fitch—in creating the financial markets crisis).
2
Editorial, Obamanomics; ‘Crisis’ is a Cover for Ruining Your Retirement, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2009, at A18 (internal quotation marks omitted). This quote is generally attributed
to former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and “has become the semi-official
motto of the Obama administration.” Id. In an interview, the New York Times quotes
Emanuel as saying, “You don’t ever want a crisis to go to waste; it’s an opportunity to do
important things that you would otherwise avoid.” Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama,
Assembling Team, Turns to the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A1 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
3
See Written Testimony of Mark Zandi: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n,
111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Zandi] (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and
Cofounder, Moody’s Economy.com) (discussing “The Causes and Current State of the
Financial Crisis” (emphasis omitted)). The Dow Jones Industrial Average, a well-known
stock market indicator, fell from an all-time high (intraday-theoretical) of 14,279.96 on
October 11, 2007 to a subsequent low of 6440.08 (intraday) on March 9, 2009—a 54.9%
decline.
DJI Historical Prices, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=%5EDJI+Historical+Priceshttp://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI+Historical+Pr
ices (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (based on author’s calculations and examination of data); see
also NYSE, A GUIDE TO THE NYSE MARKETPLACE 17 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO
THE NYSE], available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf (providing
definition of the Dow Jones Industrial Average).
4
See Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and
the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 10 (2010) [hereinafter CRA
June 2010 Hearing] (statement of Phil Angelides, Chairman, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n)
(describing the warning signs of a housing bubble, such as: mortgage fraud, deceptive
1
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From the peak in mid-2007 to the bottom in early 2009, an estimated
$17.5 trillion—more than twenty-five percent—of U.S. household net
worth evaporated.5 A combination of “[i]rresponsible risk-taking and
debt-fueled speculation—unchecked by sound oversight—led to the
near-collapse of [the U.S.] financial system.”6
Among the risk taking and incompetence that spawned this crisis,
the “big three” credit rating agencies—Standard & Poor’s Ratings
Services, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings—stand out
among the culpable.7 As sophisticated credit risk specialists, credit
rating agencies analyze and evaluate the ability of a debt issuer to meet
its financial obligations.8 Although subprime borrowers represent poor
credit risk by definition, the big three credit rating agencies still awarded
their highest credit rating—the same rating given to U.S. treasury
securities9—to thousands of bundled packages of subprime mortgages
mortgage practices, and an unprecedented eighty-nine percent increase in housing prices
from 2000 to 2006); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvi
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 CRISIS REPORT] (calling the collapse of the housing bubble “the
spark that ignited a string of events,” and noting the crisis “happened not just in the United
States but around the world”).
5
Zandi, supra note 3, at 8 (quoting Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data). During one
twelve-week period alone, five trillion dollars of Americans’ household wealth
disappeared when stocks, pensions, and home values plunged, and the capital and credit
markets virtually froze. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter BUDGET].
6
BUDGET, supra note 5.
7
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: SOVEREIGNS,
FUNDING, AND SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY 87 (2010) [hereinafter IMF] (internal quotation marks
omitted) (referring to the three leading credit rating agencies of Fitch, Moody’s, and
Standard & Poor’s as the “big three” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Examining
Proposals to Enhance the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 31 (2009) [hereinafter Senate 2009 Hearing]
(statement of Lawrence J. White, Professor of Economics, New York University) (blaming
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch and their excessively optimistic ratings of subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities for playing a central role in the financial debacle);
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 78 (2010) (“Why, for that
matter, were Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s willing to bless 80 percent of a pool of dicey
mortgage loans with the same triple-A rating they bestowed on the debts of the U.S.
Treasury?”). Lewis rhetorically asks why someone did not note that “[t]he rating agencies,
the ultimate pricers of all these subprime mortgage loans, clearly do not understand the
risk, and their idiocy is creating a recipe for catastrophe[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
8
See STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 3 (2009) (noting that
credit rating agencies specialize in evaluating credit risk and the ratings are based on
analysis by experienced professionals who evaluate and interpret information received
from issuers to form an opinion). Standard & Poor’s has published credit ratings since
1916. Id.
9
STANDARD & POOR’S, RESEARCH UPDATE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM
RATING LOWERED TO “AA+” ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK
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representing billions of dollars in loans.10 In contrast, only eight publicly
traded U.S. corporations merited a triple-A rating from Moody’s in
March 2005, and only four currently garner Moody’s triple-A rating.11
NEGATIVE 2 (2011). In a move making front-page headlines, Standard & Poor’s cut its longterm sovereign credit rating for the U.S. government from AAA to AA+ on August 5, 2011.
Id.; Damian Paletta, U.S. Loses Triple-A Credit Rating, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, at A1. This
cut was not the first reduction in the credit rating of the United States; Egan-Jones Ratings
Co. cut its rating on July 16, 2011. John Detrixhe, Egan-Jones Cuts U.S. Rating to AA+ on
Spending-Cut Concern, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2011, 4:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-07-18/egan-jones-cuts-u-s-rating-to-aa-on-spending-cut-concern-1-.html.
Before these cuts, others had questioned whether U.S. treasury securities deserved a tripleA rating. Joseph A. Giannone, Whitehead Sees Slump Worse than Depression, REUTERS (Nov.
12, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AB7HT20081112 (internal quotation
marks omitted). John Whitehead, former chairman of Goldman Sachs, noted: “Before I go
to sleep at night, I wonder if tomorrow is the day Moody's and S&P will announce a
downgrade of U.S. government bonds . . . . Eventually U.S. government bonds [will] no
longer be the triple-A credit that they've always been.” Id. In July 2010, a Chinese credit
rating agency downgraded the debt of the United States from triple-A status to a double-A
rating. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Chinese Rating Agency Strips Western Nations of AAA
Status, THE TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2010, 9:17 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/china-business/7886077/Chinese-rating-agency-strips-Western-nations-of-AAAstatus.html. This same Chinese credit rating agency subsequently cut its rating for the
United States to A+. Matt Phillips, Chinese Credit Rater Downgrades U.S., WALL ST. J. (Nov.
9, 2010, 10:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/ 2010/11/09/chinese-credit-raterdowngrades-us/.
10
See CRA June 2010 Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (describing Moody’s as a “triple-A
factory” that slapped its triple-A rating on 9,029 mortgage-backed securities worth $869
billion in 2006 alone, essentially assigning its triple-A rating to more than thirty mortgage
securities each and every working day that year); CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing, supra note 1, at 2
(describing the flood of securities backed by risky subprime loans unleashed by Wall Street
which generated billions in fees for the credit rating agencies). From 2000 to 2007, Moody’s
awarded its coveted triple-A rating to 42,625 residential mortgage-backed securities. CRA
June 2010 Hearing, supra note 4, at 9. Eighty-three percent of those securities were
eventually downgraded, causing investors heavy losses. Id. at 9–10. The Commission
found these downgrades particularly egregious as housing prices had not collapsed but
only declined four percent from their peak. Id. at 11. The Big Short gives an excellent
explanation of how the credit rating agencies awarded their highest investment ratings to
bundled packages of subprime securities—called CDOs or collateralized debt obligations.
LEWIS, supra note 7, at 72–73. Lewis describes the CDO market as such:
[T]he CDO [that] had been invented to redistribute the risk of
corporate and government bond defaults . . . was now being rejiggered
to disguise the risk of subprime mortgage loans. Its logic was exactly
that of the original mortgage bonds. In a mortgage bond, you gathered
thousands of loans and . . . created a tower of bonds . . . . In a CDO
you gathered one hundred different mortgage bonds—usually, the
riskiest, lower floors of the original tower—and used them to erect an
entirely new tower of bonds. . . . Having gathered 100 ground floors
from 100 different subprime mortgage buildings (100 different triple-Brated bonds), [investment banks] persuaded the rating agencies that
these weren’t, as they might appear, all exactly the same
things. . . . The rating agencies, who were paid fat fees by . . . Wall
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In the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the
Dodd-Frank Act”) on July 21, 2010.12 This legislation offers needed
reforms, but stops short of eradicating all the abuses at the root of the
problem and suffers from implementation delays.13 This Note argues
that the big three credit rating agencies should be required to operate by
the same rules as other financial market analysts and not receive

Street firms for each deal they rated, pronounced 80 percent of the new
tower of debt triple-A. The CDO was, in effect, a credit laundering
service . . . that turned lead into gold.
Id. In typical Wall Street gallows-humor style, a bitingly crude Microsoft Office
PowerPoint slide show titled “The Subprime Primer” provides an amusing explanation of
the
subprime
mortgage
debacle.
The
Subprime
Primer,
SLIDESHARE,
http://www.slideshare.net/guesta9d12e/subprime-primer-277484 (last visited Feb. 20,
2012). In one of the slides, a cartoon stick-figure employee at an investment banking firm is
shown gesturing toward a fly-laden garbage can and congratulating his stick-figure boss
for his genius in “creat[ing] AAA and BBB securities out of a pile of stinky, risky mortgage
loans.” Id.
11
Matt Krantz, As Company Priorities Shift, Fewer Get AAA Debt Rating, USA TODAY (Mar.
15, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2005-03-15-aaausat_x.htm (providing statistics). Ironically, one of those eight triple-A firms—American
International Group (“AIG”)—was in the process of losing its triple-A status due to its
exposure to the subprime mortgage market. Id. AIG was later the subject of a $182 billion
government bailout when the firm nearly collapsed under the weight of its exposure to the
subprime mortgage securities market. Paul Davidson, AIG Reaches a Deal to Fully Repay
Taxpayer Billions, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2010), www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
insurance/2010-09-30-aig-repayment-plan_N.htm. As of August 22, 2011, the only publicly
traded U.S. corporations with a triple-A rating from Moody’s were Automatic Data
Processing, Exxon Mobil, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft. Research & Ratings, MOODY’S,
http://v3.moodys.com/Pages/default.aspx (last visted Feb. 20, 2012) (first register with
website; then hover on “Research & Ratings” drop-down menu and select “Corporates”
from list; next, select “Investment Grade” from “Refine By” menu on left side of page; then,
select “Organizations” tab option, and then select “Organization List” hyperlink in center
table; sequentially select “Aaa,” “North America,” and “United States & U.S. Territories”
from “Refine By” menu; the resulting list shows both private and public firms; using the
“Company Search” query form at the SEC website, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
searchedgar/companysearch.html, research each company to determine corporate status).
12
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
13
Daniel A. Cotter, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, in CBA RECORD 18 (2010)
(describing a speech given by Michael McRaith, Illinois Department of Insurance Director,
in which McRaith stated that Congress’s financial services reform was a good start but did
not go far enough to address the causes of the crisis); see infra Parts II–III (discussing the
shortfalls of the Dodd-Frank Act). According to a report published by Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP, only 13% of the 400 rulemaking requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act have
been finalized as of the Act’s one-year anniversary. DAVIS POLK, ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY
REPORT: DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/
files/uploads/FIG/072211_Dodd_Frank_Progress_Report.pdf. Davis Polk claims that by
its count 130 requirements have already missed their deadlines. Id. at 4.
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selective access to confidential information.14 This special treatment has
created a “moral hazard” that endangers our entire financial system and
must be eliminated.15
This Note begins in Part II by describing the structure of U.S.
financial markets, the credit rating industry, the importance of ratings to
the financial markets, problems associated with permitting the rating
agencies to access confidential information, and the Dodd-Frank Act.16
Part III of this Note analyzes how the new Dodd-Frank Act addresses
some of the problems that have plagued the credit rating industry and
examines the unintended consequences and shortfalls of this
legislation.17 Finally, Part IV of this Note advocates that the playing field
should be leveled and the credit rating agencies should be required to
operate like other investment analysts by ending their special status and
access to confidential information.18 This change will eliminate the
special distinctions accorded this cartel, help erase anti-competitive
practices, lead to better credit ratings, and foster stronger financial
markets.
II. BACKGROUND
Despite the large role played by the credit rating agencies in the
financial markets crisis, “[t]he average American has probably never
heard of credit rating agencies.”19 This Note begins by providing an
overview of the U.S. capital markets and the credit rating agencies,
describing the power of the credit rating agencies, and noting the
growing dependency of government regulators and market participants

14
See infra Part III.C (discussing the implications of the credit rating agencies’ continuing
access to confidential information).
15
IMF, supra note 7, at 127 (defining “[m]oral hazard” as “[t]he incentive of individuals
or firms to take unreasonable risks when the consequences will not be borne by them. For
example, financial institutions have incentives to take excessive risks if they believe that
governments will step in and provide support to them in crisis periods”).
16
See infra Part II (providing general background information on the financial markets
and credit rating agencies).
17
See infra Part III (discussing some of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
18
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC regulations).
19
Credit Rating Agencies and the Next Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Edolphus Towns,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) (commenting that the credit rating
agencies were at the heart of the last financial collapse and will be at the heart of the next
financial collapse even though the average American is unaware of them). Representative
Towns also claims “Moody’s business model could be summed up as: leave no
fingerprints.” Id. at 144.
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on the integrity of credit ratings.20 This Note also explains the special
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”)
designation that was created by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) in 1975 and how that designation created a special
government sanctioned cartel.21 This Note also describes the lack of
government oversight of the credit ratings industry as well as the legal
protections that historically protected the credit rating agencies,
including their legally sanctioned ability to access confidential
information—a practice legally prohibited to other stock and bond
analysts.22 In addition, government efforts to rein in the credit rating
agencies and specific provisions of the newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act
that involve the credit rating agencies are discussed.23
A. Structure of the U.S. Capital Markets
The U.S. stock market, the home of such well-known names as
Exxon Mobil, Apple, General Electric, and International Business
Machines (aka IBM), is an estimated $18.2 trillion market—greater than
the size of the U.S. gross national product.24 Although the stock market
captures the newspaper headlines, the U.S. bond market is much larger
in comparison.25 As of the first quarter of 2011, the estimated total value
20
See infra Parts II.A–D (discussing the structure of the bond market and the credit
ratings industry).
21
See infra Part II.D (discussing the implications of the NRSRO designation).
22
See infra Parts II.E–F (discussing the ability of credit rating agencies to access
confidential information and the legal protections and lack of regulatory oversight that
have shielded the firms).
23
See infra Part II.G (discussing legislation relative to the credit rating agencies,
including the new Dodd-Frank Act).
24
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 13 (2011) (showing the
size of the U.S. gross national product); id. at 92 (providing the market value of domestic
corporations). Exxon Mobil, Apple, International Business Machines (“IBM”), Chevron,
and Microsoft represent the top five companies in the S&P 500 stock index as of August 22,
2011, ranked on market capitalization (number of shares of stock outstanding multiplied by
stock
price).
S&P
500,
STANDARD
&
POOR’S
(Feb.
17,
2012),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf-p-us-l--. The S&P 500 index is a well-known stock market index that tracks the shares of
the 500 leading companies in America, representing roughly 75% of the U.S. equities
market. Id.
25
See Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx (last updated Feb. 17, 2012) (click on “US Bond Market Outstanding”)
(giving the size of the bond market); see also ANNETTE THAU, THE BOND BOOK: EVERYTHING
INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BONDS 8 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the financial press
reports mainly on the stock market). For purposes of this Note, the author generally
combines commercial paper, notes, and other short-term debt obligations under the
“bonds” label.
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of the U.S. bond market was $35.5 trillion, nearly double the size of the
equities market.26 Advertisers may claim that America runs on donuts
and coffee, but in reality, the nation runs on leverage.27
Beyond the structural differences of the securities—fractional
ownership of a corporation in the case of a stock and an I.O.U. of a
corporation in the case of a bond—the markets for stocks and bonds
have evolved quite differently.28 Stocks generally trade electronically or
on well-recognized securities exchanges such as the New York Stock
Exchange.29 Bonds increasingly trade electronically, but a significant
percent are still sold in a fragmented, inefficient over-the-counter market
dominated by sophisticated institutional investors.30
Perhaps the largest difference between the two securities relates to
how they are evaluated by investment professionals. Stocks are typically
followed by sell-side, buy-side, and independent securities analysts who
analyze the investment prospects of the shares and produce investment
reports for use either internally by their employers or externally by
customers.31 Similar analysts, called credit analysts, operate in the bond
Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, supra note 25.
Dunkin’ Donuts Launches New Advertising Campaign “America Runs on Dunkin,”
DUNKIN’
DONUTS
(Apr.
10,
2006),
http://news.dunkindonuts.com/article_
display.cfm?article_id=1185.
28
See THAU, supra note 25, at 7–10 (discussing some of the differences between the
market for a bond and the market for a stock); A GUIDE TO THE NYSE, supra note 3, at 7, 9,
24 (providing definitions of a stock and a bond and detailing how a stock is bought and
sold); Paul Conley, How to Buy a Corporate Bond: Brokers, Over-the-Counter and ExchangeTraded Bonds, ABOUT.COM, http://bonds.about.com/od/corporatebonds/a/Corporate
bonds.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (cautioning that investing in bonds is more complex
than investing in stocks and is no place for amateurs).
29
See A GUIDE TO THE NYSE, supra note 3, at 3–10 (describing the various participants
and electronic systems involved in both electronic trading and floor trading). The New
York Stock Exchange, a well-known securities exchange, traces its roots to 1792. New York
Stock Exchange, NYSE EURONEXT, http://corporate.nyx.com/en/who-we-are/history/
new-york (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
30
See MICHAEL V. BRANDES, NAKED GUIDE TO BONDS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW—
STRIPPED DOWN TO THE BARE ESSENTIALS 12 (2003) (noting that, unlike stocks, bonds are
more frequently traded in the over-the-counter market and the trading is dominated by
institutional investors); Melanie Rodier, The Massive Growth of Electronic Bond Trading,
WALL STREET & TECH. (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207200781 (describing how the fixed income market has
become increasingly electronic and noting that U.S. corporate bonds are notoriously
illiquid); TRACE: Overview and Implications for an Evolving Credit Market, CELENT (May 8,
2006), http://www.celent.com/reports/trace-overview-and-implications-evolving-creditmarket (describing how the U.S. corporate bond market has always been plagued by a
severe lack of liquidity where prices have often been inconsistent, varying widely even for
trades of similar size executed within minutes of each other).
31
Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
analysts.htm (last modified Aug. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Analyzing Analysts]. Sell-side
26
27
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market.32 However, the importance of credit analysts in the bond market
has historically been secondary.33 Instead, most fixed-income securities
are rated for credit worthiness and repayment risk by a credit rating
agency.34

analysts typically work for full-service brokerage firms that also provide investment
banking services for corporate clients. Id. Because a sell-side analyst may recommend a
firm that is also an investment banking client of the analyst’s employer, certain conflicts of
interest can create pressure on an analyst’s independence and objectivity. Id. For example,
Henry Blodget and Jack Grubman, two prominent Wall Street sell-side analysts, were
barred from the securities industry for life and slapped with large fines for fraudulent
research reports that represented conflicts of interest. Jake Ulick, Wall St. Deal is Finalized,
CNNMONEY (Apr. 28, 2003), http://money.cnn.com/2003/04/28/news/wallst_
settlement/index.htm. Buy-side analysts typically work for institutional money managers
such as mutual funds, hedge funds, or investment advisors that purchase securities for
their own or client accounts— hence the name “[b]uy-side.” Analyzing Analysts, supra.
Independent analysts typically are not associated with brokerage or investment banking
firms. Id. These analysts typically sell their research reports on a subscription basis to
institutional investment companies. Id. Many analysts are members of CFA Institute, a
professional organization that administers a rigorous graduate-level self-study program
and awards a CFA charter that is recognized as the gold standard investment credential.
Organizational Facts and Statistics, CFA INST., http://www.cfainstitute.org/about/Pages/
facts_and_statistics.aspx?intCamp=organizational (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). Ethics,
objectivity, and integrity are important components of this program and membership.
Guiding Principles, CFA INST., http://www.cfainstitute.org/about/strategy/principles/
Pages/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
32
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-782, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE RATING AGENCY REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND
PERFORMANCE-RELATED DISCLOSURES 7 (2010) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (describing credit
analysts).
33
See Ivy Schmerken, Demand for Credit Analysts Rises on the Buy Side in Wake of Rating
Agency Disasters, ADVANCED TRADING (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.advancedtrading.com/
managingthedesk/210200320 (noting that buy-side firms typically rely on Wall Street firms
and credit rating agencies to provide them with research, but due in part to the failings of
the credit rating agencies, buy-side firms are now increasing their hiring of in-house credit
analysts to perform independent analysis). One individual went so far as to proclaim that
“the rating agencies are dead and you have to do all original work.” Id.
34
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Sen. Jim Bunning)
(questioning whether it was really necessary for the credit rating agencies to rate every
security sold to the public); Exhibits, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit
Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. exhibit #30a (2010) (containing the now
infamous instant message exchange between two Standard & Poor’s employees in which
one wrote: “[W]e rate every deal . . . it could be structured by cows and we would rate it”);
Alec Klein, Credit Raters’ Power Leads to Abuses, Some Borrowers Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
2004, at A1 (“They are rating every [bond issue] and charging for each [bond issue] . . . .”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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B. Overview of Credit Rating Agencies
The billion dollar credit rating industry can trace its roots back at
least a century.35 Today, more than seventy credit rating agencies
operate worldwide, but the industry is dominated by a few giants.36 In
the United States, three credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s, and Fitch, account for ninety-seven percent of the U.S. credit
ratings market.37
Often confused with credit reporting agencies that analyze a
consumer’s debt-repayment ability, credit rating agencies analyze the
debt-repayment ability of corporations and governments.38 It can be
difficult and costly for each potential lender to research the
creditworthiness of a specific borrower, particularly when the lender
may only purchase a small portion of a bond offering and a printed bond
offering document may represent 200 pages.39 In theory, it is much more
35
See CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing, supra note 1, at 2, 211 (noting that the big three rating
agencies had revenues of over $6 billion in 2007); About the Founder of A.M. Best, A.M. BEST,
http://www.ambest.com/about/bio.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (noting that A.M. Best
began providing reports on insurance companies as early as 1899); Moody’s History: A
Century of Market Leadership, MOODY’S CORP., http://v3.moodys.com/Pages/atc001.aspx
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (noting that John Moody founded his company in 1900 and
began publishing letter ratings on railroad securities in 1909).
36
IMF, supra note 7, at 86–87, 118–119 (providing a list of seventy-four credit rating
agencies but claiming that only the “big three” of Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s
are truly global and broad in product coverage (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37
See SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING
ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2011) (listing the number of credit ratings performed by the ten
currently recognized NRSROs and providing data revealing that 97% of the ratings were
performed by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, who held 42% percent, 37% percent,
and 18% percent market shares, respectively). The calculations given here only include the
activities of the ten NRSROs that are legally required to file reports concerning their
business operations with the SEC. Id. There are other credit rating agencies that are not
NRSROs, which operate in the United States, such as Rapid Ratings; however these firms
represent a very small segment of the industry.
History, RAPID RATINGS,
http://www.rapidratings.com/page.php?25 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
38
Apartment 604, Barney Frank, GOP Go After Credit Rating Agency Dominance:
Comments, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2009, 1:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/07/15/barney-frank-gop-go-after_n_233989.html) (“Some people on here are
confusing Wall St. credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s) with
consumer credit reporting agencies (Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion).”). Out of
thirteen comments submitted to the SEC regarding a concept release on credit rating
agencies, five letters confused credit rating agencies with credit reporting agencies (letters
of Linda B. Gates; Tommy L. Jenkins, III; Kay Leitzen; Robert W. Mabry; and Stephanie L.
Rovig). Credit Rating Agencies Review and Rulemaking: Title IX Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/dftitle-ix/credit-rating-agencies/credit-rating-agencies.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
39
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 5–6 (statement of Michael S. Barr, Assistant
Sec’y for Fin. Insts., Dep’t of the Treasury) (claiming that credit rating agencies provide a
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efficient for a credit rating agency to evaluate the credit risk of a
particular borrower on behalf of all lenders, thus avoiding a duplication
of research efforts.40
Nearly every debt instrument publicly traded in America has been
rated by at least one credit rating agency before its issuance.41 Like the
service based on scale economies, access to information, and accumulated experience that
solves a basic market failure particularly for small purchases); Jonathan Barnes, Solving the
Credit Crisis, CFA MAG., May–June 2009, at 38 (quoting Sean Egan of Egan-Jones Ratings
who describes why it is normal for some investors to rely on rating agencies due to
information or time constraints and how offering documents may be about 200 pages long);
Do the Credit Rating Agencies Deserve to Exist?, INT’L ECON., Fall 2008, at 13 (quoting Maurice
R. Greenberg, chairman and CEO, C.V. Starr and Company) (noting that market
participants need the credit rating agencies because they cannot assess the risk on their
own). This is another distinction from the equities market, where investors can gain
information about corporate financial information from central depositories such as
EDGAR. See generally Important Information About EDGAR, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited Feb 20, 2012) (providing a description).
40
See Current Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities
Markets: Hearing Before the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. (2002) [hereinafter SEC 2002 Hearing]
(statement of Stephanie B. Petersen, Senior Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co.) (noting
that the rating agencies have a prominent role in the fixed-income markets from
contributing to market efficiency to setting risk standards); Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note
7, at 5 (statement of Michael S. Barr) (noting that it would be inefficient for all lenders to get
the information they need to evaluate a borrower). Fitch describes the process in this
manner:
Rating agencies gather and analyze a variety of financial, industry,
market and economic information, synthesize that information and
publish independent, credible assessments of the creditworthiness of
securities and issuers thereby providing a convenient way for
investors to judge the credit quality of various alternative investment
options. Rating agencies also publish considerable independent
research on credit markets, industry trends and economic issues of
general interest to the investing public. By focusing on credit analysis
and research, rating agencies provide independent, credible and
professional analysis for investors more efficiently than the investors
could perform that analysis themselves.
E-mail from Stephen W. Joynt, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fitch Ratings, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/fitchratings1.htm.
41
See Roundtable to Examine Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm. 24 (Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Roundtable 2009] (statement of Deven
Sharma, President of Standard & Poor’s) (noting that Standard & Poor’s has rated trillions
of dollars of debt). While getting an appraisal from the rating agencies was once automatic,
in the aftermath of the credit crisis, more firms are turning to issuing “unrated bonds,”
because they now view the ratings as unreliable, superfluous, or worthless. Fitch Worries
About Unrated Debt, RATINGS DEBATE (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.theratingsdebate.com/
index.php?s=fitch+worries+about+unrated. While buyers of these securities may be
hesitant to invest because of a lack of information concerning the borrower’s
creditworthiness, issuing unrated bonds has become increasingly attractive to European
issuers in part due to the cost savings from not paying for a rating. Aaron Kirchfeld,
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letter-grade system used by schools, a rating agency will assign a letter
grade to debt securities based on an evaluation of the soundness and
debt-repayment ability of the firm issuing the security and the specific
debt-repayment terms governing the security.42 These letter grades
generally range from “AAA” to “D” and communicate the agency’s
opinion of the relative level of creditworthiness.43 An “AAA” rating,
also known as a triple-A rating, is the highest rating that may be given.44
The ratings universe is further broken down into two broad
categories:
investment grade securities and speculative grade
securities.45 Investment grade securities are issued by entities that are
Speculative grade
relatively stable with moderate default risk.46
securities, often referred to as “junk bonds” or non-investment grade
securities, are issued by firms that have a much higher likelihood of
defaulting on their debt obligations.47

Unrated Bond Sales Increasing in Germany as Investors Chase Higher Yields, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7,
2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-07/unrated-bond-sales-rise-ingermany-as-investors-chase-yield.html.
42
SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 21, 25 (2003) [hereinafter CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT].
43
Id.; see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: CREDIT RATINGS AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 5 (2010) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT] (listing the ratings
for the various agencies); Ratings Definitions, MOODY’S, http://v3.moodys.com/ratingsprocess/Ratings-Definitions/002002 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (describing Moody’s ratings
scheme).
44
Credit
Ratings
Definitions
&
FAQs,
STANDARD
&
POOR’S,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited Feb.
20, 2012).
45
ARNAUD DE SERVIGNY & OLIVIER RENAULT, MEASURING AND MANAGING CREDIT RISK
25 (2004). Authors Servigny and Renault write from experience, working as a managing
director and an associate director, respectively, at Standard & Poor’s. Id. at cover.
46
Id. at 25.
47
Id. Junk bonds garnered a fair measure of notoriety when financier Michael Milken of
Drexel Burnham Lambert turned these speculative securities from a forgotten sector of
Wall Street into a powerful financing engine that dramatically reshaped corporate America
in the 1980s before he was indicted on ninety-eight counts of racketeering and fraud
relating to his junk bond activities. See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE
STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 10–11 (1989)
(detailing the rise of Milken’s “historic franchise,” which he created for those companies
“rated below investment grade by the rating agencies and thus had not been able to raise
money by issuing bonds in the public market”); JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 486
(1992) (describing Milken’s indictment). Milken made $550 million in salary and bonus in
1986 and eventually agreed to pay a $600 million fine to the government for his felonies—
an amount larger than the yearly budget of the SEC. Id. at 20.
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Speculative
Grade

Investment
Grade

Ratings Schemes Used by the Three Leading Credit Rating Agencies48
Standard &
Poor’s
AAA
AA
A

Moody's
Aaa
Aa
A

Fitch
AAA
AA
A

Credit Quality
Highest Credit Quality
High Credit Quality
Strong Payment Capacity
Adequate Payment
BBB
Baa
BBB
Capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------BB
Ba
BB
Possibility of Credit Risk
B
B
B
Significant Credit Risk
CCC
Caa
CCC
High Credit Risk
CC, C
Ca
CC, C
Default Likely/Imminent
SD, D
C
D
In Default

C. Importance of Bond Ratings and Power of the Credit Rating Agencies
The difference between an investment grade security and a
speculative grade security is more than just semantics.49 The interest rate
that a bond issuer must pay to attract investors is largely determined by
the investment rating assigned to the bond by the credit rating
agencies.50 A company issuing lower-rated securities can expect to pay a
much higher interest rate and make larger interest payments than a
company issuing higher-rated securities.51 Depending on the size of the
offering and rating involved, the difference in ratings may cost a debt
issuer millions of dollars more in interest.52 Thus, a favorable rating is of
48
See PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 43 (providing a table of the big three credit
rating agencies’ rating schemes). Although the different agencies measure slightly
different credit risk characteristics and have different schemes for different categories of
securities, investors and regulators tend to view the ratings as roughly equivalent. Id. at 4.
Both Fitch and Standard & Poor’s subdivide their ratings through the use of “+” and “-”
signs after the letter grade. John Cady & Anthony Pellechio, Sovereign Borrowing Cost and
the IMF’s Data Standards Initiatives 20 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/06/78,
2006). Moody’s subdivides its ratings through the use of the numbers “1,” “2,” and “3”
after the letter grade. Id.
49
See TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING
AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS 35 (2005) (noting that the distinction
between investment grade and non-investment grade has become a market convention and
has defined the demarcation line between bonds that are speculative and those considered
acceptable for investment).
50
See id. at 73 (“Ratings affect the cost of issuing debt.”).
51
See id. at 4 (“The higher the rating, the less risk of default on repayment to the lender
and, therefore, other things being equal, the lower the cost to the borrower.”).
52
See SINCLAIR, supra note 49, at 73 (citing a 1992 study by Stephen Dafoe of Canadian
Bond Rating Service that projected savings of $0.66 million on a $200 million bond issue);
Frederic M. Biddle, Wall Street’s Bond Busters; The Bay State Feels the Rating Agencies’ Wrath,
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immense importance to those issuing debt securities, and in some cases,
a favorable rating can make or break a bond deal.53
A high credit rating is also important to bond market investors.54
Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, certain institutional
BOS. GLOBE, July 30, 1989, at 63 (quoting an estimate by Massachusetts’ deputy treasurer
Patrick Sullivan that recent rating downgrades could cost the state of Massachusetts $20
million a year in additional interest); see also John Y. Campbell & Glen B. Taksler, Equity
Volatility and Corporate Bond Yields, 58 J. FIN. 2321, 2327 (2003) (providing a table of average
corporate bond yield spreads between corporate bonds of various credit qualities
compared to government treasury instruments of similar maturity). Using figures from
this table, the difference between the average yield spread on BBB-rated bonds and AArated bonds in 1999 (an extreme period) was 90 basis points (175 minus 85). Id. Thus, a
BBB-rated bond issuer paid an additional $2.25 million in annual interest compared to an
AA-rated issuer on a hypothetical $250 million bond deal in 1999. Id.
53
See INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE
ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/
ios/20030930/02.pdf (“Credit ratings can affect issuers’ access to capital, influence the
structure of financial transactions, and determine the types of investments fiduciaries and
others can make.”); The Make-or-Break Power of Ratings Agencies, INDEPENDENT (May 10,
2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/the-makeor
break-power-of-ratings-agencies-1970100.html (claiming that the credit rating agencies can
rattle markets with nothing more than a change of heart). For example, in King County v.
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, the court noted that “the Rated Notes would not sell
without the Rating Agencies’ highest ratings.” 751 F. Supp. 2d 652, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see
also Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 165
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A credit rating is important to both issuers and investors.”). In the words
of Representative Henry Waxman, “for Wall Street’s investment banks, a triple-A rating
became the independent validation that turned a pool of risky home loans into a financial
gold mine.” CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
54
See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that, once a security has
received a favorable rating, the security is easier to sell to investors and a high rating
carries with it a regulatory benefit). A high credit rating assumed such importance that a
new line of bond default insurance was created in the 1970s around bond ratings. See
MGIC Forms Municipal Bond Insurance Company, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, July 7, 1971, at pt. 2,
p. 5 (announcing the formation of American Municipal Bond Assurance Corp. and noting
that the concept of insuring the payment of principal and interest on municipal bonds is a
new concept in the financial field). In return for a fee, a bond insurer would agree to insure
a bond offering against the risk of default and the bond would be assigned the same credit
rating as the bond insurer. See CHRISTINE S. RICHARD, CONFIDENCE GAME: HOW A HEDGE
FUND MANAGER CALLED WALL STREET’S BLUFF 5 (2010) (explaining the mechanics of this
process). The bond would be given the same rating as the bond insurer because the
insurance company carried the ultimate payment burden. Id. If the bond issuer was
unable to make the required payments to investors, the insurance company was then
required to make those payments instead. Id. Under one sleight of hand arrangement, for
example, a hospital with a non-investment grade rating paid an insurance company
$500,000 for bond insurance but saved an estimated $25 million in interest because of the
higher credit rating awarded its bonds. See id. at 134 (describing the experience of
Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation). Allegheny later filed for
bankruptcy. Id. at 97. Two things are important to remember when analyzing the conflicts
of interests inherent in this feat of financial magic: (1) the credit rating agencies assigned
the ratings to all the parties involved—the bond issuer, the insurance company, and the
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investors could only invest in “investment grade” securities as rated by a
nationally recognized rating agency or those investors would incur
regulatory penalties for holding securities that were not investment
grade.55 Even in the wake of this new legislation, many bank lending
documents, mutual fund prospectuses, and private lending contracts
dictate that investments only be made in investment grade securities or
contain “triggers” that mandate that a firm must maintain a certain
credit rating.56
Because of the importance of credit ratings to the financial markets,
the rating agencies wield tremendous power and are viewed as
“essential financial gatekeepers” who function as “unofficial regulators”
rather than merely as credit analysts.57 Credit ratings by the rating
agencies are viewed differently from the “buy,” “sell,” or “hold”
recommendations that equity analysts assign to stocks. Instead, an
investment grade credit rating is considered a “Good Housekeeping Seal
of Approval.”58 In keeping with this “gatekeeper” status, credit ratings
actual bond offering; and (2) the credit rating agencies received large fees for this business.
Id. “Companies like Moody’s make huge fees every time they rate a security backed by
[bond insurer] MBIA,” noted hedge fund manager Bill Ackman in June 2003 when he tried
to warn the SEC about conflicts of interests between the bond insurers and the credit rating
agencies. Id. at 94. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6–8; see infra Part II.G (describing how the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandates the removal of
credit ratings from government regulations).
56
See IMF, supra note 7, at 92 (noting the widespread use of credit ratings in numerous
private sector contracts); see e.g., Complaint at 6–7, Water Works Bd. v. Ambac Fin. Grp.,
No. 2:09-cv-02296-WMA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58904 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2010) (describing
the terms of a trust indenture in which “the requirements for the Water Works Board in the
event that the rating claims paying ability of the municipal bond insurer who issued the
surety bond falls below and [sic] S&P's rating of ‘AAA’ or a Moody's rating of ‘Aaa.’”); see
also COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, ENRON’S CREDIT RATING: ENRON’S BANKERS’ CONTACTS
WITH MOODY’S AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, S. DOC. NO. 107-83, at 2 (2nd Sess. 2003)
[hereinafter ENRON] (commenting that the implications of downgrading Enron’s debt from
an investment grade rating to junk credit rating were important to Enron given its liquidity
problems). Triggers tied to credit ratings in a number of agreements would have
constituted a default or forced the firm to post significant amounts of collateral. Id.
57
See CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing, supra note 1, at 1, 4 (using the term “essential financial
gatekeepers” and noting that “[t]he credit rating agencies occupy a special place in our
financial markets.
Millions of investors rely on them for independent objective
assessments”); RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME LENDER: AN INSIDER’S TALE
OF GREED, FRAUD, AND IGNORANCE 106 (2008) (calling the rating agencies “unofficial
regulators”); see also Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Information Failure and the U.S.
Mortgage Crisis 20 (Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-19, 2010) (“Most investors
look[] to rating agencies to serve as information proxies regarding default and loss risk.”).
58
See CRA June 2010 Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (“Credit rating agencies have played a
pivotal role in our financial markets. Their Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval guided
decisions by individuals and institutional investors alike”); AMANDA J. BAHENA, WHAT
ROLE DID CREDIT RATING AGENCIES PLAY IN THE CREDIT CRISIS? 1 (2010) (“A credit rating is
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are provided free of charge to the public on the websites of the credit
rating agencies, which is another departure from how analysts in the
stock and bond market typically operate.59
The three leading credit rating agencies predominately operate
under the “issuer-pays” business model, which takes its name from who
is paying the credit rating agency for its services.60 Under the “issuerpays” business model, the credit rating agency is paid by the debt
issuer.61 In contrast, under the “subscriber-pays” business model used
by some of the big three’s competitors, the credit rating agency is paid by
the ratings user, similar to a magazine subscription.62 The issuer-pays
not a measure of the value or profitability of a financial instrument or of the debtor; it is not
the same as a buy, sell, or hold recommendation from an investment analyst.”). The rating
agencies themselves are quite eager to reinforce this distinction: “Standard & Poor’s
ratings are not indications of investment merit. In other words, the ratings are not buy,
sell, or hold recommendations, or a measure of asset value.” STANDARD & POOR’S, supra
note 8, at 4.
59
See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 9 (noting how such ratings are generally free to the
public); Roundtable 2009, supra note 41, at 46 (statement of Raymond W. McDaniel, Jr.,
Chairman and CEO of Moody’s) (describing that under the “issuer-pays” business model,
“ratings are made available to the investing public free of charge, [which] is, I think, a
significant benefit”); Boris Groysberg, Paul Healy, Craig Chapman, Devin Shanthikumar &
Yang Gui, Do Buy-Side Analysts Out-Perform the Sell-Side? 1, 2, 8–11 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=806264 (outlining how buy-side and
sell-side analysts operate and are compensated); Analyzing Analysts, supra note 31 (noting
how brokerage firms do not usually directly charge for analyst research reports, but an
analyst report can indirectly generate brokerage commissions); see also supra note 11
(describing how to access credit ratings on Moody’s website).
60
IMF, supra note 7 (providing a list of credit rating agencies with their business
models); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 60 (describing the “issuer-pay” business
model).
61
IMF, supra note 7, at 94 (describing the mechanics of the issuer-pays model and noting
that “almost all credit ratings are paid for by the issuer of the instruments”).
62
GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 9, 60–61 (describing the “subscriber-pays” business
model). Before the late 1960s–early 1970s, the leading credit rating agencies operated
under the subscriber-pays business model. E-mail from Stephen W. Joynt, supra note 40;
STEPHANE ROUSSEAU, CAPITAL MARKETS INSTITUTE, ENHANCING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: THE CASE FOR A DISCLOSURE-BASED APPROACH 11 (2005).
However, the growth of low-cost photocopying technology made it difficult for the credit
rating agencies to limit access to their ratings only to paying subscribers, incentivizing
them to change to a different model. Id. The massive default of Penn Central
Transportation Corporation in 1970 frightened investors and gave bond issuers further
incentive to pay to have their bond offerings rated by credit rating agencies if they wished
to reassure and attract investors. Id.; Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 43, 47 (2004). Debt issuers’ willingness to pay for ratings was also increased when
the SEC created the NRSRO concept in 1975 and incorporated credit ratings into brokerdealers’ minimum capital requirements based on the quality of the positions held in their
portfolios. Id. at 53–54; Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris, Rating Agencies: Civil Liability
Past and Future, 238 N.Y. L.J. 88 (2007). The “subscriber-pays” business model is also called
the “investor-pay” or “user-pay” model. IMF, supra note 7, at 87, 94. Some commentators
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business model has been criticized by many for its inherent conflicts of
interest in which a credit rating agency’s reputation for reliable credit
ratings must struggle against keeping and appeasing a paying credit
ratings customer.63 The issuer-pays model introduces the potential for a
argue this model is more timely and efficient than the issuer-pays model. See Transforming
Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 70 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.]
(statement of James H. Gellert, Chairman and CEO of Rapid Ratings International)
(testifying that agencies that use only publically available data outperform those that use
confidential information); William H. Beaver, Catherine Shakespeare & Mark T. Soliman,
Differential Properties in the Ratings of Certified vs. Non-Certified Bond Rating Agencies, 42 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 303, 332 (2006) (finding that subscriber-pays firms performed better than
issuer-pays firms); Martin Mayer, Credit Rating Agencies in the Crosshairs, BROOKINGS (Aug.
2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/0831_ratings_agencies_mayer.aspx
(reporting that William Gross, PIMCO’s managing director, says his business would be fine
without the rating agencies).
63
See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 2 (arguing that the rating agencies’ dependence on
revenues from the firms they rate could induce them to temper their diligence and assign a
rating more favorable than circumstances would warrant); IMF, supra note 7, at 94 (noting
that the issuer-pays model might give an issuer an incentive to “shop around” for the best
rating since the issuer is paying for it); see also King Cnty v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank
AG, 751 F. Supp. 2d 652, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that investment banking firm Morgan
Stanley knew that the rating agencies had bent to its pressure to accept large concentrations
of risky subprime securities); Legislative Proposals to Improve the Efficiency and Oversight of
Municipal Finance: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 93, 3 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.] (statement of Sean Egan)
(“[T]hese companies have, for the last 35 years, been in the business of facilitating the
issuance of securities for the benefit of issuers and underwriters.”); CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing,
supra note 1, at 3 (quoting a portfolio manager from Vanguard, a large mutual fund
company, who told Moody’s that the rating agencies “allow issuers to get away with
murder” (internal quotation marks omitted)). U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin may
best express the inherent problem:
Contrary to past practices where they were paid by investors, the
Rating Agencies were compensated by the Cheyne SIV and Morgan
Stanley at a fee substantially larger than normally received and a fee
that was directly connected to the success of the Cheyne SIV. This
structure created a conflict of interest that compromised the objectivity
of the ratings. There is no question that companies can conduct
business legally, even in the face of conflicts of interest, provided that
proper safeguards are in place. The existence of conflicts of interest
alone typically is not sufficient to establish that defendants
“knowingly” made a false and misleading statement. But where both
the Rating Agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process
was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment,
and knew that the Rating Agencies could not issue an objective rating
because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be
plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the Rating Agencies knew
they were disseminating false and misleading ratings.
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 178–79
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
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gaming of the system in which decisions by credit rating agencies may
be influenced by the companies paying for the rating.64
D. Evolution of a Regulatory Scheme and the Market’s Increasing Reliance on
Ratings
The importance accorded credit ratings by the financial markets
today is arguably due to the government’s involvement.65 In the wake of
the October 1929 stock market crash, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency incorporated ratings from the credit rating agencies into
banking guidelines.66 This ratings push spread to state and federal
insurance and securities regulations and picked up particular
momentum when the SEC created a special designation in 1975 for those
credit rating agencies that met certain financial and industry reputational
hurdles in a vetting process.67 The SEC called this newly created
subclass of credit rating agencies NRSROs because of their nationally
recognized status and highly respected reputation as experts in assigning
credit ratings.68
In awarding this NRSRO status, the SEC was not seeking to confer
an unfair advantage on a select group of firms.69 Rather, the NRSRO
designation fit into a regulatory scheme that the SEC and other
government agencies used for regulating firms under their watch.70 It
became convenient, for example, for Congress to require that a mortgage
related security “be rated in one of the two highest rating categories by

IMF, supra note 7, at 94; Karen Brettell, Help Needed to Reduce Reliance on Credit Ratings,
REUTERS (July 16, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56F3TJ20090716?
pageNumber=1.
65
See FRANK PARTNOY, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, RETHINKING REGULATION OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 4 (2009) (describing
how government regulators have turned to the rating agencies and “rating agencies have
shifted from selling information to selling ‘regulatory licenses,’ keys that unlock the
financial markets”); see also CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6–8 (describing the
regulatory use of credit ratings).
66
See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Ratings Industry, FRBNY Q. REV.,
Summer–Fall 1994, at 6 (detailing the historical development and providing a table of
selected rating uses in government regulations); see also PARTNOY, supra note 65, at 4
(noting how regulators turned to the credit rating agencies in the wake of the stock market
crash).
67
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6–10; Cantor & Packer, supra note 66, at 8.
68
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 5–9.
69
See id. at 6 (explaining that “[t]he requirement that [a] credit rating agency be
‘nationally recognized’ was designed to ensure that its ratings were credible and
reasonably relied upon by the marketplace” and the term “NRSRO” was originally
adopted solely for making regulatory capital determinations).
70
Id.
64
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at least one NRSRO.”71 A regulatory examiner could then easily
reference a bond’s credit rating to determine if the security was suitable
for investment.72 However, this strategy also required that the credit
rating agency issuing the rating itself be credible, thus creating a need for
NRSRO accreditation.73 Because of the government’s mandated use of
credit ratings and an accreditation process, firms with NRSRO credit
ratings were then viewed as a credible authority, and “the
creditworthiness judgments of these third-party raters . . . attained the
force of law.”74
But NRSRO regulations that helped simplify the government’s job
had the opposite effect of making the tasks of others harder.75 Other
credit rating agencies that lacked the NRSRO designation found it hard
to compete against the NRSROs, not because they were less capable, but
solely because they lacked the NRSRO designation.76 Issuers seeking to
sell high-quality debt simply had no incentive to hire rating firms lacking
the NRSRO designation because that designation was a mandatory
investing requirement for certain debt investors.77 New credit rating
entrants seeking NRSRO status felt disadvantaged by the SEC, who for
many years never formalized the NRSRO approval process.78 Moreover,
a Catch-22 provision for receiving NRSRO status had the effect of

Id. at 7–8. The quoted language, which was found at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(41) (2006), has
been replaced by “meets standards of credit-worthiness as established by the
Commission,” as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939(e)(1), (g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1886–87
(2010).
72
See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: UNDERSTANDING THEIR
CENTRAL ROLE IN THE SUBPRIME DEBACLE OF 20072008, at 4 (2009) (noting that, rather than
using their own resources to form judgments about the safety of bonds held by banks, bank
regulators delegated or outsourced their safety judgments about suitable bonds to the
credit rating agencies).
73
See id. at 5 (describing the SEC’s worry that “bogus” rating firms could award high
credit ratings to certain companies in return for suitable rewards).
74
Id. at 3–5 (emphasis omitted).
75
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing how the NRSRO designation by
the SEC represents a barrier to entry into the rating business). By 2009, there were nearly
ninety references to NRSROs in U.S. banking and securities statutes, regulations, and
guidance documents. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, JOINT FORUM, STOCKTAKING
ON THE USE OF CREDIT RATINGS 87–118 (2009).
76
ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 13–14.
77
Id.; WHITE, supra note 72, at 5; Cantor & Packer, supra note 66, at 8.
78
See WHITE, supra note 72, at 6 (describing that the SEC never established criteria for
designating a firm as a NRSRO, never established a formal application and review process,
and never explained why it selected some firms for the NRSRO designation and not
others); Cantor & Packer, supra note 66, at 8 (claiming that the informality of the process
and the opaqueness of the acceptance criteria raise serious problems with the NRSRO
designation).
71
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keeping new entrants out as well.79 To become an NRSRO, a firm
needed to be “nationally recognized.”80 Yet, without the NRSRO
designation, how was a firm to acquire clients and become nationally
In effect, the government’s involvement created a
recognized?81
government-sanctioned cartel where “too much power and influence
[was] held by too few institutions.”82
E. Credit Rating Agencies’ Access to Confidential Information
Unlike other stock and bond analysts who are barred from
selectively receiving confidential information under the securities laws
due to insider trading concerns, a credit rating agency hired by a bond
issuer is permitted access to material nonpublic information, similar to
the access provided an outside accountant or attorney.83 This nonpublic
information may range from internal corporate budgets and forecasts to
advance notification of major corporate events, such as a merger.84
Credit rating agencies use this confidential information to formulate
See SEC 2002 Hearing, supra note 40 (statement of Paul Saltzman, Executive Vice
President and General Counsel, The Bond Market Association) (asking if a lower level of
recognition rather than national recognition can be used instead so that it is not an
unreasonable barrier to entry); ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 14 (noting how the criteria of
being “nationally recognized by the predominant users of ratings in the United States as an
issuer of credible and reliable ratings” favors existing rating agencies).
80
Cantor & Packer, supra note 66, at 8.
81
See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Statement
Regarding the NRSRO Proposal Before the Open Meeting (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030305cag.htm
(describing the process of
receiving the NRSRO designation as “opaque” or “Kafkaesque,” and noting that “[r]ating
agencies cannot be an NRSRO unless their ratings are nationally recognized, yet they
cannot achieve national recognition without being recognized by the SEC staff as an
NRSRO, a classic ‘chicken and egg’ problem”). This speech also described that applicants
may wait years before being told they do not meet the criteria for NRSRO status without
being told exactly why they did not meet the criteria. Id.
82
See Lois R. Lupica, Credit Rating Agencies, Structured Securities, and the Way Out of the
Abyss, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 639, 654 (2009) (pointing out the problems with the
current NRSRO structure).
83
See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)–(2) (2010) (noting the exceptions, which
permit access by an attorney, investment banker, or accountant and the specific restrictions
against access that apply to those affiliated with investment companies, broker-dealers, and
investment managers); FITCH RATINGS, WORLDWIDE CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
AND
SECURITIES
TRADING
POLICY
6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/credit_policy/confidentiality_conflicts_of_int
_sec_trad_policy.pdf (explaining that the general public cannot access the commentary
and analysis that ratings agencies provide paying issuers); E-mail from Stephen W. Joynt,
supra note 40 (discussing Fitch’s ability to access nonpublic information and its usefulness
in forming a qualitative judgment about a company’s management and prospects).
84
See E-mail from Stephen W. Joynt, supra note 40 (describing the types of nonpublic
information that Fitch might access).
79
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their initial bond ratings as well as for periodic monitoring and
“consulting” or “rating advisory” purposes.85 For example, a company
in the process of an acquisition, recapitalization, or major asset sale will
often contact the credit rating agency to inquire into the impact of the
major event on their credit rating.86 For a consulting fee, the credit rating
agency will provide the company with an estimate of the likely impact
on the bond rating from the major event.87
Theoretically, this access to nonpublic financial information should
not only lead to more accurate credit ratings, but it also represents a
hazard, as those “privy to the information beforehand [may be] able to
make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.”88
Although the leading credit rating agencies generate the bulk of their
revenues from fees paid by the bond issuer and provide free ratings on
their websites, the big three agencies still have paid subscribers who
receive access to additional reports and research unavailable to the
general public.89 These paid subscribers also routinely have access to
employees of the credit rating agency responsible for a particular
rating.90 Regulators are rightfully concerned whether the employees of
credit rating agencies intentionally or inadvertently disclose confidential
nonpublic information to paid subscribers.91

Id.
Id.
87
See id. (describing this process and noting that initially Fitch did not charge for this
service, but as this accommodation became more demanding on the firm’s time, it started
to charge its customers). Fitch also notes that both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s have
been charging their customers for that service for some time. Id.
88
Final
Rule:
Selective
Disclosure
and
Insider
Trading,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm (last modified Aug. 21, 2000).
89
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 22; GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 9;
ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 18.
90
ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 18.
91
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 35. In testimony before a SEC investigation,
Deborah A. Cunningham, Chief Investment Officer for Federated Investors Money Market
Funds, described how her firm evaluates the information provided by the credit rating
agencies on a subscription basis to her company, and how she makes a decision whether to
subscribe even if the actual letter rating itself is available for free to the public: “The much
more important aspect of the rating agency information that we receive is on the actual
analysis itself . . . not the actual letter.” Roundtable 2009, supra note 41, at 138. The SEC
even investigated the market sell-off of equity securities that occurred before Standard &
Poor’s downgrade of the US credit rating to determine whether Standard & Poor’s leaked
information. Mark Gongloff, SEC Asking About Insider Trading at S&P: Report, WALL ST. J.
BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011, 9:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/08/12/sec-askingabout-insider-trading-at-sp-report/.
85
86
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Regulation and Oversight of the Credit Ratings Industry

Despite the government’s growing reliance on credit ratings, the
powerful credit rating agencies themselves have operated with scant
government oversight for much of their 100-plus year history.92 Instead,
judicial decisions and government regulations largely shielded them
from legal liability for faulty ratings.93 Unlike auditors, accountants, and
investment bankers, the credit rating agencies were not liable as experts
for the investment ratings that they assigned to the debt securities they
rated, and the First Amendment gave them protection for their credit
“opinions.”94
A complaint filed against Moody’s by Jefferson County School
District over a 1993 bond offering illustrates how this First Amendment
protection may lead to abuse.95 Despite employing Moody’s in the past,
Jefferson County declined to hire the firm for a new bond offering, using

See CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 18 (“[B]ecause credit rating agencies are
subject to little, if any, formal regulation or oversight, and their liability traditionally has
been limited both by regulatory exemptions and First Amendment protections afforded
them by the courts, little exists to hold them accountable for future poor performance.”); see
also In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act to dismiss a class action claim); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s
Investors Servs., 499 F.3d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying defamation and breach of
contract claims involving a credit rating report); Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331,
333 (7th Cir. 1999) (denying claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract
concerning a credit rating awarded a collateralized mortgage obligation); First Equity Corp.
v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to hold a credit rating
agency liable for an inaccurate publication); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank
of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 262–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing claims against
the rating agencies for Section 11 violations and “control person liability”); Cantor &
Packer, supra note 66, at 4 (noting the threat of legal liability for inaccurate ratings by a
ratings agency has not yet materialized and how certain cases against the firms have been
dropped); Larry P. Ellsworth & Keith V. Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the Spotlight:
A New Casualty of the Mortgage Meltdown, 18 BUS. L. TODAY 35 (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2009-03-04/ellsworth.shtml (noting that even though
the credit rating agencies face the threat of mounting litigation, they possess a number of
substantial legal defenses due to their unique treatment under the U.S. Constitution and
regulatory system); Sack & Juris, supra note 62 (noting that the NRSROs have largely been
insulated from liability).
93
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 30 (stating that credit rating agencies do not
face any meaningful risk of liability); CRA June 2010 Hearing, supra note 4, at 441–47 (“[T]he
difference between Moody’s and an accounting firm or a law firm is that at least there is
some theoretical risk that the accounting firm and the law firm might be found liable.”).
94
PARTNOY, supra note 65, at 2, 15–16; ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 35–36; Ellsworth &
Porapaiboon, supra note 92; Sack & Juris, supra note 62.
95
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th
Cir. 1999).
92
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two other credit rating agencies instead.96 When Jefferson’s bonds were
brought to market, the school received subscriptions from investors for
the purchase of substantially all the bonds.97 However, less than two
hours after the sale began, Moody’s electronically published an article
about Jefferson that it sent to subscribers and news services.98 Even
though Moody’s had not been paid to rate Jefferson’s bond deal and any
information that Jefferson had sent to Moody’s was more than a year old,
Moody’s determined at that particular time that its “outlook on the
district’s general obligation debt is negative” and noted the school’s
ongoing financial pressures and legal uncertainties.99 Within minutes,
another electronic news service repeated Moody’s comments, purchase
orders for Jefferson’s bonds ceased, and several buyers canceled earlier
orders.100 The school was ultimately forced to reprice the bonds at a
higher interest rate to complete the deal at a cost of $769,000.101
Jefferson sued Moody’s claiming that Moody’s published the article
to retaliate against it for refusing to use Moody’s to evaluate its bonds.102
The school asserted claims under state “law for intentional interference
with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective
contractual relations, and publication of an injurious falsehood.”103
Jefferson’s suit was dismissed based on First Amendment grounds
protecting the expression of opinions.104 Moody’s negative comments
about Jefferson which hurt the profitability of the school’s bond offering
were deemed to be constitutionally protected expressions of Moody’s
opinion.105
G. Market Reform Measures Relating to the Credit Rating Agencies
To prevent threats to market integrity through the selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information and insider trading, the

96
Id. at 850. The bond offering was actually a refinancing deal in which the school
wanted to take advantage of lower interest rates. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. In the article, Moody’s noted that even though it had not been asked to rate the
bonds, it intended to assign a rating to the issue after the sale. Id.
99
Id. at 850–51. In its complaint, the school alleged that Moody’s statement was
materially false in that it conveyed the impression that Moody’s assessment of the school’s
financial condition was based on current information. Id. at 850.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 851.
102
Id.
103
Id. Later, the school unsuccessfully attempted to add antitrust claims against Moody’s
for monopolization and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act. Id.
104
Id. at 860–61.
105
Id.
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SEC adopted a new rule, Regulation FD, in 2000.106 Regulation FD
clarified the disclosure requirements that applied to stock and bond
analysts as well as other securities market professionals, but it
specifically exempted credit rating agencies from these requirements:
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its
behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information
regarding that issuer or its securities to any person [who
is a broker or dealer, investment adviser, institutional
investment manager, investment company, or person
associated with those entities or a holder of the issuer’s
securities] . . . , the issuer shall make public disclosure of
that information . . . :
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional
disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional
disclosure.
....
(b)(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply
to a disclosure made:
(i) To a person who owes a duty of trust or
confidence to the issuer (such as an attorney, investment
banker, or accountant);
(ii) To a person who expressly agrees to maintain
the disclosed information in confidence;
(iii) To an entity whose primary business is the
issuance of credit ratings, provided the information is
disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a credit
rating and the entity’s ratings are publicly available; or
(iv) In connection with a securities offering
registered under the Securities Act.107
The credit rating agencies were specifically exempted and permitted
access to nonpublic information because their ratings were viewed as a

106
Regulation FD, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 243); see
Philippe Jorion, Zhu Liu & Charles Shi, Informational Effects of Regulation FD: Evidence from
Rating Agencies, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 310–11 (2004) (describing Regulation FD’s prohibition
of selective disclosure of nonpublic information).
107
Regulation FD, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. This special exemption for the credit rating
agencies was removed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.; see infra Part III.C (detailing the change
to Regulation FD).
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valuable “public good.”108 Government regulators did not believe this
same argument held true for other Wall Street analysts and felt
permitting them access to confidential information would “defy the
principles of integrity and fairness.”109 In crafting this regulation, the
SEC noted that: “selective disclosure bears a close resemblance . . . to
ordinary ‘tipping’ and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few
gain an informational edge—and the ability to use that edge to profit—
from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their
skill, acumen, or diligence.”110
Had the 2001 Enron bankruptcy debacle never occurred, the special
treatment given credit rating agencies and the NRSRO oligopoly
involving Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch may have continued
indefinitely.111 However, the big three agencies only downgraded
Enron’s debt securities a mere four days before Enron filed for
bankruptcy.112 The massive size of this bankruptcy and the late timing of
the ratings downgrade sparked a large public outcry against the rating
agencies who were supposed to be respected credit analysis experts—
particularly since this was not the first large bankruptcy filing tied to
inaccurate credit ratings.113
See IMF, supra note 7, at xiii (describing the “public good” characteristic of ratings in
aggregating and how it is difficult to obtain private information).
109
SEC News Supplement: Opening Statement of Chairman Arthur Levitt, Open Meeting on
Regulation Fair Disclosure, SEC (Aug. 10, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/
seldisal.htm.
110
Regulation FD, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 243). For an
example of the SEC’s use of Reg. FD see SEC Charges Office Depot and Company Executives
with Improper Disclosures to Analysts, SEC (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-202.htm.
111
See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 1–2 (noting the highly publicized alleged failures by
credit rating agencies to warn investors in a timely manner about the impending
bankruptcies of Enron and others, and explaining how this has raised concerns in Congress
about the role and performance of the NRSROs and the SEC’s supervision of the industry).
112
CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 3; GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 2; see
ENRON, supra note 56, at 13 (noting that government committee staff believed that the credit
ratings agencies should have downgraded Enron to below investment grade much earlier
than they did).
113
See ENRON, supra note 56, at 1 (describing how Enron’s collapse was particularly
shocking and problematic because of its size and the appearance that its sudden downturn
could be traced to widespread fraud); see also The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the
Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Rep. Paul
E. Kanjorski) (discussing the failure of the credit raters Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and
Fitch to warn investors about the severe financial problems of WorldCom, New York City,
Washington Public Power Supply System, and Orange County); PARTNOY, supra note 65, at
5 (describing both Enron and the Orange County default as prominent examples of when
issuers continue to receive high credit ratings until just before they file for bankruptcy
protection).
108
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In the wake of Enron’s bankruptcy, congressional hearings were
held to determine whether efforts by Enron’s bankers and government
officials convinced Moody’s not to downgrade Enron’s debt despite
financial liquidity problems.114 These hearings uncovered that had
Moody’s lowered Enron’s debt to below investment grade status, Enron
would have been unable to enter into trading agreements with
counterparties and one of the firm’s most profitable divisions would
have been unable to operate.115 Contractual “triggers” tied to credit
ratings in a number of Enron’s business agreements would have either
pushed the firm into default or required the firm to post significant
amounts of cash collateral had its rating been downgraded.116 Such a
downgrade would have effectively terminated a proposed merger
between Enron and another company due to a material adverse change
clause in the merger agreement.117
In response to the poor performance by the big three relating to
Enron’s bankruptcy and the subsequent 2002 WorldCom default, the
U.S. Government enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006.118 This legislation gave the SEC new regulatory powers over the
rating agencies and encouraged the SEC to award NRSRO status to
additional credit rating companies to lessen the oligopolistic grip the big
three had on the franchise.119 While this legislation increased the
number of NRSRO firms to ten, it did little to alter the dominant position
of the big three agencies, as evidenced by their current ninety-seven
percent market share.120 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
ENRON, supra note 56, at 1.
Id. at 2.
116
See id. (providing a detailed history of the events surrounding Enron); see also IMF,
supra note 7, at 92 (noting the widespread use of “ratings triggers” in financial contracts
that terminate credit availability or accelerate credit obligations in the event of specified
downgrades).
117
ENRON, supra note 56, at 3.
118
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006);
see GARY SHORTER & MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40613, CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR REGULATION (2009) (noting the “spectacular failures” of the
credit rating agencies in relation to Enron and WorldCom who retained their high credit
ratings until a few days before they filed for bankruptcy).
119
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006);
PARTNOY, supra note 65, at 67; see GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 2–3 (describing provisions
of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act).
120
GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 56–57; Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last modified May 12, 2011). The ten NRSROs
are: A.M. Best Company, Inc. (added Sept. 24, 2007); DBRS Ltd. (added Sept. 24, 2007);
Egan-Jones Rating Company (added Dec. 4, 2008); Fitch, Inc. (added Sept. 24, 2007); Japan
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (added Sept. 24, 2007); LACE Financial Corp. (added Feb. 11,
2008); Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (added Sept. 24, 2007); Rating and Investment
Information, Inc. (added Sept. 24, 2007); Realpoint LLC (added June 23, 2008); and
114
115
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also did not address all the conflicts of interest that exist in the credit
rating industry, such as rate shopping, and actually barred private rights
of action against the credit rating agencies.121 The recent subprime
mortgage debacle merely brought these issues back into the spotlight.
The subprime mortgage crisis was not a new phenomenon, but
simply déjà vu all over again with investors once again left holding the
bag.122 Like most market meltdowns, the subprime mortgage debacle
was fueled by excessive leverage, in this case, of risky subprime
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (added Sept. 24, 2007). See Letter from Nancy M.
Morris, Sec’y, SEC, to A.M. Best Co., Inc. Corp. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56507.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC, to DBRS Ltd. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/3456508.pdf; Letter from Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, SEC, to Egan-Jones Rating Co.
(Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-59056.pdf; Letter
from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC, to Fitch, Inc. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56509.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC, to Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56510.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC,
to
LACE
Fin.
Corp.
(Feb.
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-57300.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC, to Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56511.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC, to Rating and Inv.
Info., Inc.
(Sept.
24, 2007), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56512.pdf; Letter from Florence E. Harmon,
Acting
Sec’y,
SEC,
to
Realpoint
LLC
(June
23,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58000.pdf; Letter from Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
SEC, to Standard & Poor’s Ratings Servs. (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/34-56513.pdf.); Credit Rating Agencies-NRSROs,
supra; Seven Credit Rating Agencies Register with SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, SEC (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-199.htm;
see also No Action Letters, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last modified
Mar. 5, 2005) (“An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product,
service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request a
‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff.”); supra note 37 (providing details of 97% market share
calculation).
121
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 15E(m)(2), 120 Stat.
1327, 1336 (2006); see Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 23 (“[I]ssuers went shopping for
ratings like they were shopping for used cars.”). “Rate shopping” is the practice whereby
an issuer unhappy with a credit rating from one rating agency simply moves to another
rating agency in search of a more favorable rating. Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 23.
122
See Francis A. Bottini, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and
Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 584–600 (1993)
(detailing a lengthy history of rating failures and serious industry problems). Bottini adds
additional companies to the lengthy list already presented by the Author. Id. at 606; see also
Randy
Myers,
Ratings
Disaster,
CFO
MAG.
(June
1,
2010),
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14499520 (comparing Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s to
operators of nuclear reactors and asking whether they would still be in business given their
record as architects of one ratings failure after another over the past decade). Baseball
player Yogi Berra is famous for the expression “déjà vu all over again.” ALLEN BARRA,
YOGI BERRA: ETERNAL YANKEE xxxiv (2009).
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mortgage loans extended to borrowers with bad credit histories based on
little or no loan documentation or loan down payment.123 These
subprime mortgages bore scant resemblance to traditional mortgages;
instead, they resembled an “assembly-line affair” of repackaging and
reselling in which even a $14,000-a-year strawberry picker could receive
a mortgage for a $720,000 home.124 The complex securities created by the
securitization of these subprime loans and the movement away from
relationship-based lending grounded in trust created a systematic
failure.125
When the subprime market imploded, the crash was literally felt
around the world.126 Trillions of dollars of subprime mortgage securities
had been sold to investors.127 Due to the widespread use of subprime
securities, their inherent complexity, and the high degree of leverage
involved, the subprime mortgage crisis led to: government bailouts,
bankruptcy filings, large scale investment write-downs, and a raft of
lawsuits.128
In response, the United States enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to rein in
the abuses.129 Noting both the systemic importance of credit ratings and
the reliance placed on those ratings by individuals, institutions, and
regulators, Congress believed that credit ratings were of national public

123
See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 95 (2009) (describing subprime loans as high risk and
noting these loans were increasingly extended to borrowers with bad credit histories on
whatever terms the players wished).
124
See id. (claiming the subprime lending market developed into a free-for-all with little
government oversight). According to Tett, sales of subprime mortgage bonds totaled $800
billion in 2005, meaning that almost half of all mortgage-linked bonds in America that year
were based on subprime loans. Id.
125
See Lupica, supra note 82, at 644–45, 653, 659 (blaming the credit rating agencies for
failing to adapt their quantitative models to reflect the lower underwriting standards used
by lenders in awarding loans); see also SERVIGNY & RENAULT, supra note 45, at 15, 366–67
(explaining the mechanics and growth of securitization and how it represents a major shift
in the role of commercial banks in financial markets).
126
See Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis is Felt
Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/
business/worldbusiness/31derivatives.html?pagewanted=all (commenting that investors
in some foreign countries were surprised to find that the problems with U.S. subprime
mortgage securities could be felt so keenly in their home markets).
127
Id.; see CRA June 2010 Hearing, supra note 4, at 8; see also Levitin & Wachter, supra note
57, at 18 (noting that historically low rates on Treasuries left investors hungry for yield and
eager for more attractive alternatives).
128
2011 CRISIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 22–23; Zandi, supra note 3, at 1–3; Anderson &
Timmons, supra note 126.
129
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 [2012], Art. 5

1118 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

interest and central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the
efficient performance of the economy.130 Congress found:
Credit rating agencies, including nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations, play a critical
“gatekeeper” role in the debt market that is functionally
similar to that of securities analysts, who evaluate the
quality of securities in the equity market, and auditors,
who review the financial statements of firms. Such role
justifies a similar level of public oversight and
accountability.131
Because of the value Congress placed on the credit rating agencies,
this sweeping legislation provides for a new Office of Credit Ratings,
requires new internal controls to help credit rating agencies monitor
conflicts of interest, calls for enhanced regulation and transparency of
NRSROs, and mandates various SEC and General Accountability Office
studies.132 In addition, Section 933 of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the
ability of NRSROs to use statutory safe-harbor protections for forwardlooking statements, loosens the pleading standards in private rights of
action, and treats statements made by a credit rating agency in the same
manner as statements made by a public accounting firm or securities
analyst under the securities laws.133 Significantly, the Dodd-Frank Act
removes the protection that NRSROs enjoyed from “expert” liability
under Section 11 by repealing Rule 436(g), eliminates the exemption
pertaining to credit rating agencies in Regulation FD, and directs that
each federal agency:
remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on
credit ratings [in its regulations] and . . . substitute in
such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as
each
respective
agency
shall
determine
as
appropriate . . . . In making such determination, such
Id. § 931(1).
Id. § 931(2).
132
Id. § 932–939H. Among the findings in this massive Act, Congress found:
Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial “gatekeepers” do,
the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in
character and should be subject to the same standards of liability and
oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and investment
bankers.
Id. § 931(3).
133
Id. § 933.
130
131
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agencies shall . . . tak[e] into account the entities
regulated by each such agency and the purposes for
which such entities would rely on such standards of
credit-worthiness.134
Like its less sweeping predecessor the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006, the Dodd-Frank Act targets a number of credit rating
abuses.135 Sadly, like its predecessor, the Dodd-Frank Act also permits
certain industry abuses to continue and is not without its unintended
consequences and shortfalls.136 This legislation—if it is ever fully
implemented—should only be viewed as a first step in addressing some
of the problems that have plagued the securities markets, as additional
measures are needed.137 Part III of this Note addresses some of these
considerations.
III. ANALYSIS
Called by some the most sweeping change to financial regulation
since the Great Depression, the Dodd-Frank Act ushers in a sea of
change in the way the capital markets operate.138 Its provisions call for
the creation of new regulatory offices, the tightening of numerous
regulations, and the expansion of regulation to additional segments of
the financial markets.139 Unfortunately, more than a year later, many of
its reform measures have still not been implemented; some reform
measures of the Dodd-Frank Act do not take effect until a future date,
and in some cases, a perceived abuse is only subject to government study
rather than actual change.140 Part III of this Note offers an analysis of
some of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that impact the credit

134
Id. §§ 939A(b)(a), 939B, 939G; see supra text accompanying note 107 (giving the original
language of Regulation FD).
135
See supra Part II.G (discussing the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006).
136
See infra Part III (detailing some of the abuses that may continue under the DoddFrank Act).
137
See JOHN C. PARTIGAN, PRACTICAL TIPS FOR MEETING WITH CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
AFTER DODD-FRANK (2011), available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/
publications/http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Securities_
Law _Alert_05_23_2011.pdf (noting that the agencies can still access material nonpublic
information under the Dodd-Frank Act); infra Part IV (offering a suggested improvement to
the Dodd-Frank Act).
138
Cotter, supra note 13.
139
See supra Part II.G (describing some of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
relate to the credit rating agencies).
140
Cotter, supra note 13; see supra note 13 (documenting that only 13% of the regulations
required by Dodd-Frank have been finalized).
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rating agencies, evaluating both the strengths and shortcomings of those
provisions.141
A. Implications of Removing References to Credit Ratings from Government
Regulations
“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”142
As noted previously, the U.S. credit ratings industry is dominated by
three giants who control ninety-seven percent of the market and wield
tremendous power.143 One of the Dodd-Frank Act’s biggest strengths is
its acknowledgement of the need for repair and legislative changes in the
credit rating industry.144 By removing any references to credit ratings in
government statutes or regulations, the Dodd-Frank Act is making a
bold move toward reining in the tremendous power of the NRSROs.145
This move is not without risk and the potential for unintended
consequences. However, given the inability of the reform measures
passed in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 to either address
or prevent the problems behind the subprime mortgage debacle, it is
clear that additional reforms are necessary.146
For over seventy years—either by choice or mandate—investors,
regulators, issuers, and other market participants have used credit
ratings in making investment decisions and structuring their business
operations.147 As noted previously, certain institutional investors could
only invest in investment grade securities and were required to sell those
holdings if the bond rating dropped to non-investment grade.148
Regulatory reliance on credit ratings has been faulted by many as
141
See infra Part III (outlining how the new Dodd-Frank Act will impact the perceived
shortcomings of the credit ratings industry).
142
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 2001)
(quoting Lord Acton).
143
SEC, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 37; see supra Part II.C–D (discussing the importance
of bond ratings, the power of the credit rating agencies, and the market’s reliance on credit
ratings).
144
See supra Part II.G (describing some of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
145
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010); see supra text accompanying note 134 (providing the
language from the Dodd-Frank Act, which discusses the removal of credit ratings from
agency regulations); supra Part II.C–D (discussing the power of the credit rating agencies
and the government’s reliance on NRSROs).
146
See supra Part II.G (noting the continued dominance of the big three agencies despite
the passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and abusive practices).
147
See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 7–8 (describing some of the uses of credit ratings by
financial markets participants); supra Part II.D (tracing the history of this reliance on credit
ratings since the 1930s).
148
See supra Part II.C (noting that both regulatory and contractual provisions often
demanded that certain institutional investors only own investment grade securities).
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perpetuating the hold that the NRSRO cartel has over the rating industry
by creating barriers to entry, fostering excessive investor trust in the
value of credit ratings, and artificially creating a demand for ratings.149
Eliminating government reliance on ratings would eliminate this source
of power over borrowers, and market forces would be free to work.150
Under this approach, regulated institutional investors and financial
institutions will bear the burden of justifying the safety of their bond
portfolios to regulators.151 This strategy is expected to improve ratings
quality and create a healthier rating industry by fostering competition
and forcing institutions to play a more decisive role.152
149
Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 32 (statement of Lawrence J. White, Professor of
Economics, New York University). Professor White also argues that detailed regulation of
the NRSROs would not be necessary if market forces were permitted to work, particularly
given the institutional nature of the bond market where sophisticated investors are better
positioned to monitor the process and not a retail securities market where retail customers
need more guidance and help in investing. Id. “Critical market participants relied too
much on NRSRO ratings and the NRSRO designation should not equate to a government
good housekeeping seal of approval . . . . That has had lots of unintended consequences.”
See Roundtable 2009, supra note 41, at 186 (statement of Christopher L. Gootkind, Vice
President and Fixed Income Portfolio Manager, Wellington Management) (commenting
from his experience as a credit analyst, research director, and fixed income portfolio
manager on the problems with the credit ratings industry and the issuer-pays business
model); see also Lupica, supra note 82, at 654–55 (pointing out the problems with the current
NRSRO structure, and commenting that the internal policies of the credit rating agencies
have in effect adjusted the “ground rules” of international capital markets and shaped the
internal organization and behavior of those institutions seeking funds).
150
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 32 (urging government officials to “[e]liminate
[the credit rating agencies’] force of law, and bring market forces to bear”); see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 32, at 47–48 (describing some of the mechanics of removing those
references from regulations).
151
Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 32–33. In the words of Professor White:
[T]he burden should be placed directly on the regulated institutions to
demonstrate and justify to their regulators that their bond portfolios
are safe and appropriate, either by doing the research themselves or by
relying on third-party advisors who might be the incumbent rating
agencies, or might be new firms that none of us have discovered yet,
but could come forth in this more open environment. Since financial
institutions could then call upon a wider array of sources of advice on
the safety of their bond portfolios, the bond information market would
be opened to innovation and entry and new ideas in ways that have
not been possible since the 1930s.
Id. William Gross, managing director of PIMCO, one of the nation’s largest institutional
bond investment firms, is quoted as saying that credit ratings should be abolished given
the rating industry’s poor track record; his business would get along fine without them.
Mayer, supra note 62. Gross noted: “Their quantitative models appeared to have a Mensalike IQ of at least 160, but their common sense rating was closer to 60, resembling an idiot
savant with a full command of the mathematics, but no idea of how to apply them.” Id.
152
See Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 32–33 (discussing the benefits of competition
and institutional markets in ratings).
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This change should also reduce the ability of the credit rating
agencies to coerce issuers into using their rating services or to retaliate
against them.153 It is a power that the agencies have been willing to
exploit, and many corporations, municipalities, and foreign governments
are wary of the credit rating agencies because of their abusive strongarmed tactics and high fees.154 As one chief financial officer expressed it,
“[T]hey can pretty much charge the fees they want to . . . . You have no
choice but to pay it.”155 Observers have also charged that the credit
rating agencies continually find new circumstances to extract fees.156 In
the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, if a bond issuer is no longer “required”
to have its bonds rated by a credit rating agency, the issuer now has the
opportunity to stop paying a rating fee.157 Indeed, this is already
153
See supra Part II.C (outlining the power of the credit rating agencies); supra Part II.F
(describing the problems encountered by Jefferson County School District when it declined
to use Moody’s services for its bond offering and Jefferson’s claim of retaliation against
Moody’s).
154
See Klein, supra note 34 (describing the credit rating agencies’ strong-armed tactics and
threats). In his Washington Post article, Alec Klein paints a frightening picture of coercion
in the credit ratings industry. Id. Klein describes the travails of Hannover Re, who
received a letter from Moody’s informing the firm that it intended to rate its financial
health “at no charge.” Id. However, the letter suggested that “Moody’s looked forward to
the day Hannover would be willing to pay.” Id. Because Hannover “was already writing
six-figure checks annually” for ratings from two of Moody’s competitors, the firm did not
see the need to pay for another rating from Moody’s. Id. Over the successive years,
Moody’s continued to rate Hannover even though the firm did not pay, giving it
progressively weaker ratings and telling Hannover that, if it paid for the rating, it “could
have a positive impact” on the grade. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Eventually,
Moody’s cut Hannover’s debt rating to junk status at the same time that other credit rating
firms were giving Hannover a clean bill of health. Id. Hannover’s stock immediately
dropped, lowering Hannover’s market value roughly $175 million within hours. Id.
Klein’s article also sheds light on the fee structure of the credit rating agencies. Id.
According to Moody’s, in 2004 a credit rating cost between $50,000 and $300,000 for a
corporate borrower. Id.
155
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Life has been very good to the credit rating
agencies:
The leading credit rating agencies grew rich rating mortgage-backed
securities and CDOs. . . . [T]otal revenues for the three firms[]
double[d] from $3 billion in 2002 to over $6 billion in 2007. At
Moody’s, profits quadrupled between 2000 and 2007. In fact, Moody’s
had the highest profit margin of any company in the S&P 500 for [five]
years in a row.
CRA Oct. 2008 Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
156
See Klein, supra note 34 (quoting a former Wall Street banker who claims that the
credit rating agencies charge clients for many different securities, even if the ratings are all
the same); see also E-mail from Stephen W. Joynt, supra note 40 (noting that initially Fitch
did not charge its clients for rating advisory services, but later started charging its
customers for this accommodation).
157
See Klein, supra note 34 (chronicling the experience of an investment banker who
suggested that a cash-strapped school district drop one of its two credit ratings to save
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happening to a small degree, particularly in Europe where “unrated”
bonds are being sold.158 Less demand for credit ratings should translate
into less power for the credit rating agencies to wield and less potential
for abuses to occur.
Yet the complexity of this task is not to be underestimated, and the
potential for negative consequences is real.159 According to a 2009
survey of its member authorities by The Joint Forum, there were eightyone references to NRSRO ratings in U.S. federal banking and securities
statutes, legislation, regulations, and guidance.160 In July 2008, the SEC
proposed amendments to remove references to NRSRO ratings from
Although the SEC subsequently removed
several SEC rules.161
references to NRSROs from six rules and two forms, it retained the use of
ratings or delayed further action on two rules over concerns that the
proposed new credit standards might instead permit riskier securities to
qualify for investment than those securities permitted for investment
In the United States Government
under the existing rule.162
Accountability Office’s opinion, without a plan for ensuring that the new
standards of creditworthiness required by the Dodd-Frank Act
accomplish what they are designed to do, and that examiners have the
requisite skills to apply the new standards, the risk is that any new
standards of creditworthiness used in place of the NRSRO ratings may
not be effective.163 Noting the level of difficulty associated with
removing credit ratings from government regulations, a senior associate
director of the Federal Reserve commented: “To protect the safety and
soundness of individual banking firms and of financial stability more
broadly, we are striving to develop alternative standards of
creditworthiness . . . that possess the virtues of credit ratings but not the
vices.”164
Other potential negative consequences remain. As the power of the
credit rating agencies diminishes, their willingness to maintain the
integrity of their credit ratings in the face of customer retaliations and
money, but reversed that advice after Standard & Poor’s threatened to pull all the school’s
ratings).
158
See supra note 41 (discussing the increasing use of unrated bonds).
159
See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 47–53 (describing the SEC’s previous experience
with proposals to remove credit rating references from its regulations and its hesitation to
implement those proposals fully).
160
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 75, at 87–118 (2009); GAO REPORT,
supra note 32, at 48.
161
GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 47.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 96, 100.
164
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Mark E. Van Der Weide).
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defections will come under attack.165 For example, in the wake of
Standard & Poor’s well-publicized downgrade of the United States in
August 2011, the Senate Banking committee began gathering information
about the downgrade, the SEC launched an inquiry into the situation,
and some market observers questioned whether a concurrent
Department of Justice investigation of the firm was the government’s
way of retaliating for the downgrade.166 Following that lead, several
municipalities fired Standard & Poor’s over their debt downgrades.167 In
light of the tremendous power of the U.S. government, it is perhaps not
surprising that neither Fitch nor Moody’s supported Standard & Poor’s
U.S. downgrade decision and perhaps not a coincidence that Devin
Sharma, Standard & Poor’s president, agreed to step down not long after
the downgrade was announced.168 It is a valid worry that the credit
rating agencies will knuckle under the pressure from debt issuers for
higher than deserved credit ratings.
Market inefficiency and higher costs are other potential problems.
As noted previously, it is much more efficient for one firm to analyze a
particular bond on behalf of all potential lenders than have separate
lenders duplicate that analysis.169 In congressional testimony, the
165
See supra Part II.C (discussing problems with the issuer-pays business model and how
credit rating agencies struggle against keeping and appeasing a paying credit rating
customer).
166
See Jean Eaglesham & Jeannette Neumann, SEC Checks S&P’s Downgrade Math, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576504
631278044492.html (reporting that “the [SEC] will scrutinize the model used by creditrating firm Standard & Poor’s to downgrade” the United States); Susanna Kim, Standard
and Poor’s: Downgrade Backlash?, ABC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/standard-poors-justice-department-reportedly-investigates-credit-rating/story?
id=14332010 (discussing whether a Department of Justice investigation of Standard &
Poor’s is coincidence or political payback for Standard & Poor’s downgrade of the United
States); Rachelle Younglai & Richard Cowan, Senate Panel Reviewing S&P Downgrade,
REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/us-usadebt-congress-idUSTRE7775UO20110808 (noting that a Senate panel was gathering
information about Standard & Poor’s).
167
See Kate Linthicum, Los Angeles to Quit Hiring Standard & Poor’s to Rate Its Investments,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/18/local/la-me-0817-spcity-20110818 (discussing the decision of Los Angeles and two other municipalities to quit
using Standard & Poor’s after the agency downgraded the municipalities’ bonds).
168
See Claes Bell, Fitch Joins Moody’s with AAA for US, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 16, 2011,
11:00 AM), http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/fitch-joins-moodys-with-aaafor-us/ (discussing Fitch’s and Moody’s decisions not to downgrade the United States after
Standard & Poor’s did); S&P President Sharma to Leave, Replaced by Citi’s Peterson, FOX BUS.
(Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2011/08/22/sp-upgradesgoogle-stock-days-after-sell-view/ (announcing the departure of Standard & Poor’s
president).
169
See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of the credit rating agencies and their
value). “Done properly, [credit rating agencies’] evaluations of credit risk are essential to
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Federal Reserve specifically noted the particular burden placed on
smaller banks lacking the credit assessment resources of larger banks.170
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress itself noted the value of the gatekeeper
Without question, a bright-line
role that the NRSROs play.171
creditworthiness standard such as a credit rating holds great intuitive
appeal and is much simpler and less expensive than performing credit
analysis on an investment portfolio of securities.
Timing is another issue. As mentioned previously, deadlines for 130
of the 400 regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act have already
been missed.172 Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairwoman Shelia
Bair has publicly commented about the difficulty of finding an
alternative to credit ratings in the time frame that the legislation
mandates.173 Warren Buffett, Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, and
indirectly, Moody’s biggest shareholder, perhaps sums the situation up
best: “As problematic as ratings were in this crisis and the central role
they played, finding an alternative is going to be very, very difficult.”174
B. Implications of Tackling the Issuer-Pays Problem
For years, critics have called for the end of the issuer-pays business
model in the credit ratings industry, and the cautious approach taken by
the Dodd-Frank Act in respect to that issue is disappointing, but not
surprising.175 As discussed previously, borrowers pay the credit
agencies directly for their ratings under the issuer-pays model, which
many market participants who lack the resources or skill to make an independent
evaluation.” Do the Credit Rating Agencies Deserve to Exist?, supra note 39, at 13 (quoting
Maurice R. Greenberg, chairman and CEO, C.V. Starr and Company).
170
See supra text to note 165 (noting that the Federal Reserve Board is particularly
sensitive to the difficulties faced by smaller banks).
171
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010); see supra note 132 (listing congressional findings in the
Dodd-Frank Act).
172
See supra note 13 (citing Davis Polk Dodd-Frank Progress Report).
173
FDIC Unsure How to Comply with Rating Agency Provisions, RATINGS DEBATE (Jan. 4,
2011), http://www.theratingsdebate.com/fdic-unsure-how-to-comply-with-rating-agencyprovisions/.
174
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 939D, 124 Stat. 1376, 1888 (2010) (mandating that the Comptroller General of the
United States study the compensation issue); GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 2 (quoting an
SEC report that this compensation model could induce the credit rating agencies to rate
issuers more liberally and temper their diligence in probing for negative information);
Roundtable 2009, supra note 41, at 84 (calling the business model of the credit rating agencies
and the issuer-pays model broken); Myers, supra note 122 (noting that some critics believe
that “[credit] rating agencies watered down their standards” to win business under the
issuer-pays model).
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can create multiple conflicts of interest.176 For example, credit agencies
are permitted to advise the firms whose securities they rate, which may
lead to a gaming of the system to achieve the desired credit rating.177 In
addition, critics charge that the rating agencies are often slow to lower a
rating due to the potential implications of a downgrade.178
Under Section 939D of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Government
Accountability Office is merely required to conduct a study of alternative
compensation means for NRSROs and submit that report and any
recommendations to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.179 The purpose of this study is to evaluate
alternative means for compensating NRSROs to create incentives for the
NRSROs to provide more accurate credit ratings, and a number of
alternate compensation strategies have been offered by various market
observers.180 According to Sean Egan, President of Egan-Jones Rating
Company, the problem with various rating industry reform proposals is:
[T]hey proceed from the erroneous premise that the
major rating agencies are in the business of providing
timely and accurate ratings for the benefit of
investors . . . when, in fact, these companies have, for the
last 35 years, been in the business of facilitating the
See Myers, supra note 122 (discussing the “issuer-pays” business model).
[A]ll [the credit rating agencies] were doing is being paid by the very
people they were rating. Never bothered to do due diligence at all to
determine whether or not these products were as creditworthy as they
were claiming to be. And yet still to this day [the credit rating agencies
are] suggesting somehow that they are independent, conducting risk
evaluation at all. Quite the opposite.
Senate 2009 Hearing, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd).
177
See supra Part II.C (describing this process).
178
Brettell, supra note 64; see supra note 56 (discussing the implications of downgrading
Enron’s debt and whether the credit rating agencies should have acted sooner).
179
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 939D, 124 Stat. 1376, 1888 (2010)
180
Id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 79–93. During an April 2009 roundtable held by the
SEC to examine the oversight of the credit rating agencies, participants were asked their
opinions of the issuer-pays business model and whether one business model represented a
better approach to managing conflicts of interest than another. Roundtable 2009, supra note
41, at 4. The goal was to better align the credit raters’ interest with those who rely on the
credit ratings. Id. Based on that meeting and other congressional hearings, the
Government Accountability Office identified five alternative business models in various
stages of development that have been proposed to replace the issuer-pays model. GAO
REPORT, supra note 32, at 79–84. Some of these included: a random selection model, an
investor-owned credit rating agency model, a stand-alone model, a designation model, and
a user-pay model. Id.
176
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issuance of securities for the benefit of issuers and
underwriters.181
Empirical evidence by Stanford University researchers would appear
to support Mr. Egan’s contentions.182 In a study comparing Egan-Jones,
a “subscriber-pays” firm, to Moody’s, an “issuer-pays” firm, researchers
noted that Egan-Jones’ ratings were more timely, and the firm made
nearly twice as many rating changes over the period studied.183 The
Stanford researchers hypothesized that either Moody’s was more
conservative in its ratings approach than Egan-Jones or lacked the
incentive to be competitive and responsive to its constituents.184 Their
conclusions concerning Moody’s were particularly damning:
[T]he results of this paper are also consistent with
Moody’s market power. The certified agencies within
the credit rating industry have an effective oligopoly
due to various regulations that have developed over
time. It is nearly impossible for firms to have a
successful bond issue without a certified agency rating.
Therefore, Moody’s has little incentive from competitive
pressures to be responsive to the needs of investors.185
It is worth noting, despite the massive attention focused on Standard &
Poor’s downgrading of the United States’ credit rating on August 5,
2011, Egan-Jones Ratings in fact downgraded the United States in July
2011—beating Standard & Poor’s to the punch.186
C. Implications of Continuing Access to Confidential Information
The Dodd-Frank Act’s handling of confidential information relative
to the credit rating agencies is another weakness of the new legislation.
Section 939B states: “Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment
of this subtitle, the SEC shall revise Regulation FD (17 C.F.R. 243.100) to
remove from such regulation the exemption for entities whose primary
2009 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 63, at 3.
See generally Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman, supra note 62, at 332 (comparing the
performance of ratings from Egan-Jones, a “subscriber-pays” firm, with the performance of
ratings from Moody’s, an “issuer-pays” firm; finding that Egan-Jones’ ratings were
timelier, performed better for investors, and were more closely aligned with their interests).
183
Id. at 305.
184
Id. at 306.
185
Id. at 332–33.
186
See supra note 9 (describing the Egan-Jones downgrade as well as two earlier
downgrades of the United States by a Chinese rating agency).
181
182
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business is the issuance of credit ratings (17 C.F.R. 243.100(b)(2)(iii)).”187
The problem with this change is that the Dodd-Frank Act is not
eliminating the rating agencies’ ability to access material nonpublic
information.188 Rather, the elimination of the exemption means only that
a credit rating agency now owes a duty of trust or confidence to a debt
issuer if it wishes to continue to access confidential information—the
Dodd-Frank Act does not even require that the credit rating agency sign
a formal confidentiality agreement.189 Thus, a shortfall of the DoddFrank Act is that it continues to permit this potentially abusive practice.
Laws banning the use of insider information, such as Regulation FD,
prohibit a corporation from selectively releasing sensitive confidential
information to others, such as stock analysts, for their use.190 However, a
double standard exists in relation to the rating agencies that operate
under the issuer-pays model, as they have successfully convinced debt
issuers and regulators that access to such confidential information is
necessary for accurate ratings.191

187
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 939B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887–88 (2010).
188
Id.; PARTIGAN, supra note 137; see CRA 2003 ROLE REPORT, supra note 42, at 22
(claiming that the larger credit rating agencies typically maintain confidentiality
agreements with the issuers that they rate).
189
Partigan, supra note 137. Regulation FD provides that:
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to
any person [who is a broker, dealer, investment adviser, institutional
investment manager, investment company, person associated with
those entities or a holder of the issuer’s securities], the issuer shall
make public disclosure of that information . . . [s]imultaneously, in the
case of an intentional disclosure; and [p]romptly, in the case of a nonintentional disclosure.
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2010). Regulation FD also specifically protects or
excludes disclosures made to persons who owe a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer
and those who have expressly agreed to maintain the disclosed information in confidence.
Id. § 243.100(b)(2). A good example of this policy in operation is the enforcement action
that the SEC announced against Office Depot, Inc. and two of its officers. SEC Charges
Office Depot, supra note 110. The SEC charged Office Depot with selectively disclosing
material nonpublic information to its largest investors and Wall Street analysts regarding
the fact that Office Depot would not meet Wall Street’s earnings estimates. Id. These
private discussions violated Regulation FD, which requires that a firm make a
simultaneous disclosure of nonpublic material information. Id. Office Depot agreed to
settle with the SEC and paid a one million dollar fine. Id. Office Depot’s chief executive
officer and chief financial officer also paid fines of fifty thousand dollars each. Id.
190
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2010); Jorion, Liu & Shi, supra note 106, at 310–11.
191
See Final Rule, supra note 88 (claiming that because credit rating agencies publicly
disclose their ratings, it is appropriate to permit them access to nonpublic information); see
also Jorion, Liu & Shi, supra note 106, at 2 (noting that selectively disclosing confidential
information to equity analysts was widely perceived as market abuse).
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Not all agree that such access is necessary. For example, Jerome
Fons and Sylvain Raynes, two former employees of Moody’s who now
operate their own firms, argue that ratings models should be more
objective and have a stronger emphasis on fundamental data to
minimize the influence of human judgment.192 Ratings based on
statistical fundamentals and limited human interpretation can ensure a
more objective view of risk in their opinion.193 In Fons’s view, the
industry needs to get away from the large credit rating agencies having
all the power, and reforms and proposals for the industry must be
careful not to further entrench the large firms.194
Surprisingly, comments from Moody’s president Raymond W.
McDaniel support the views of Fons and Raynes as well: “The ratings
process is produced by human beings, and human beings have views
and emotions about certain things . . . . We do not deny there are latent
or inherent conflicts of interest in our business.”195 Human grudges can
be ugly, and at least one unfortunate firm, whose combative executives
alienated some of Moody’s analysts, ended up with a lower credit rating
than its financials would suggest, costing it potentially millions in extra
interest payments.196
Finally, empirical evidence also argues against a continuation of this
practice. As noted previously, the ratings assigned to debt issuers by
Egan-Jones, a firm not privy to issuers’ confidential information,
outperformed the ratings assigned to debt issuers by Moody’s, a firm
with access to issuers’ confidential information.197 Likewise, James H.
Gellert, Chairman and CEO of Rapid Ratings International, a firm which
only uses publicly available statistical data in formulating its ratings,
claims that his firm’s ratings performance “far [exceeds] the traditional
[issuer-pays] rating agencies in innumerable cases and also typically
outperform[s] the prevalent market-based default probability models.”198
This access to confidential information creates an unfair competitive
advantage relative to other market analysts.199 A bond analyst employed
by a Wall Street firm is not permitted access to confidential information.200
Brettell, supra note 64.
Id.
194
Id.
195
Klein, supra note 34, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196
See id. (quoting a former Moody’s analyst who claimed that this firm’s rating was
reduced by approximately a full notch due to personality issues with Moody’s employees).
197
See supra Part III.B (describing this performance).
198
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 62, at 70 (2009) (statement of James H. Gellert, Chairman
and CEO of Rapid Ratings International).
199
Jorion, Liu & Shi, supra note 106, at 1–4.
200
Id.
192
193
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Yet, that same confidential information is available to a bond analyst
employed by a credit rating agency merely because of the rating agency’s
perceived gatekeeper function in the market.201 A large problem, as
discussed previously, is that the credit rating agencies have the potential
to tip that information either intentionally or unintentionally to their
paid subscribers or others.202 The general public receives the ratings for
free from the credit rating agencies, but they are not privy to the
commentary and analysis that paid subscribers receive, which may be
quite valuable in communicating nuances in a rating.203 According to
University of California researchers Jorion, Liu, and Shi, this access
confers a strategic advantage to the credit rating agencies.204
While acknowledging the special treatment that subscribers to the
credit rating agencies’ services receive, Stephanie Petersen from Charles
Schwab also brings up a valid point in her SEC testimony regarding the
value that the credit rating agencies provide in disseminating
information.205 According to Petersen, some municipal bond issuers are
better than others at releasing financial information to the public, as they
are not required to follow the rules for dissemination that publicly
traded companies must follow.206 Central depositories of municipal
information do not exist, as they do for corporate financial information,
such as the SEC’s EDGAR system.207 According to Petersen, the clout
wielded by the credit rating agencies often can be brought to bear upon
the reluctant municipal bond issuers who have been remiss in supplying
timely financial information to bond holders.208 This testimony suggests
that reducing the power of the credit rating agencies by eliminating their
access to confidential information could lead to less debtor financial
Id.
See Gongloff, supra note 19 (describing the SEC’s investigation of the major market
sell-off of equity securities and heavy trading volume that occurred before Standard &
Poor’s decision to downgrade the United States and whether that information was leaked);
see also supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing how regulators are concerned with
the disclosure of confidential information and whether it is being disclosed intentionally or
inadvertently).
203
See FITCH RATINGS, supra note 83, at 6 (describing how analysts at Fitch “may discuss
the analysis supporting the rating of any Rated Entity or any Securities on investor calls” in
the company’s confidentiality policy); see also Roundtable 2009, supra note 41, at 138
(providing comments of Deborah Cunningham that support the value to institutional
investors of receiving this paid information from the credit rating agencies).
204
Jorion, Liu & Shi, supra note 106, at 1, 22.
205
SEC 2002 Hearing, supra note 40 (statement of Stephanie B. Petersen, Senior Vice
President, Charles Schwab & Co.).
206
Id.
207
Id. See generally Important Information About EDGAR, supra note 39 (providing a
description of this central depository).
208
SEC 2002 Hearing, supra note 40.
201
202
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information available for analysis. Restricting the credit rating agencies’
ability to access confidential information could also lead to less accurate
credit ratings. Ask yourself intuitively whose ratings you would trust
most: the firm with access to confidential information about the debtor
or the firm without access to confidential information about the debtor?
The Dodd-Frank Act makes a number of valuable changes to the
laws affecting credit rating agencies that should reduce future abuses. In
addition, it has valuable proposals in place for future rulemaking that
have the potential for stopping further abuses. However, “studying” is
not the same as “stopping.” The Dodd-Frank Act needs to level the
playing field and require the credit rating agencies to operate like any
other investment analyst. It must be amended to address the credit
ratings industry problems.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The Dodd-Frank Act offers the potential for needed improvements,
but a stronger legislative reach is necessary to make sure that the
problems are corrected. This Note advocates that the time for change is
now, and the approach is intuitively simple. Rather than creating
elaborate government-imposed business models and complex and
lengthy regulations, simply by removing the special preferences that
have protected the credit rating agencies and requiring them to operate
like other market participants, this Note argues that the forces of the free
market will level the playing field and clean up the abuses of the
industry.
The Dodd-Frank Act falls short of mandating all the necessary
reforms that may prevent other financial market meltdowns from
occurring. The underlying problem that has historically permeated the
credit ratings industry is the special treatment the NRSRO firms have
enjoyed relative to other market participants. The newly enacted DoddFrank Act eliminates much of this special treatment. Gone is the
regulatory reliance on credit ratings, which gave the NRSROs a
guaranteed market for their ratings.209 Also whittled back are the legal
protections shielding the NRSROs from liability for faulty credit
ratings.210 Congress left the NRSRO designation intact, but placed
additional monitoring restrictions on those firms.211 Further, because of
the removal of NRSRO references in government regulations, that
209
See supra Part II.G (describing the Dodd-Frank Act); supra Part III.A (discussing the
implications of removing credit ratings from government regulations).
210
See supra Part II.G (describing the changes in the Dodd-Frank Act).
211
See supra Part II.G (noting the imposition of new internal controls to monitor conflicts
of interest).
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franchise is less valuable. What will happen in the issuer-pays area is
undecided and being studied, but is unlikely to be adequately fixed by
current proposals.212 What can fix all these issues in a deceptively simple
manner is to simply eliminate the NRSRO’s access to confidential
information.
This Note proposes several additions to the Dodd-Frank Act that are
much broader than the existing legislation and are more definitive.
Regulation FD—which regulates access to confidential information—
should be amended to prohibit the use of confidential information by the
credit rating agencies for credit rating purposes. Under this Note’s
suggestion, those credit rating agencies who wish to provide consulting
services to particular clients will still be free to do so. However, because
consulting entails access to confidential information, this Note advocates
that the credit rating agencies should not be permitted to offer both
consulting and rating services to the same clients simultaneously.
A. Prohibiting the Use of Confidential Information and Ability to Provide
Consulting and Ratings Services to the Same Clients
To correct the deficiencies in the Dodd-Frank Act, both the Public
Law itself and the relevant SEC federal regulation need to be changed as
follows:
Public Law 111–203 [H.R. 4173]
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
An Act
To promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,

212
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SEC. 939B. ELIMINATION OF EXEMPTION FROM
FAIR DISCLOSURE RULE AND PROHIBITION
AGAINST ACCESS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
subtitle, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
revise Regulation FD (17 C.F.R. 243.100) to remove from
such regulation the exemption for entities whose
primary business is the issuance of credit ratings (17
C.F.R. 243.100(b)(2)(iii)) and prohibit their access to material
nonpublic information for ratings purposes. Credit rating
agencies may still access material nonpublic information for
consulting purposes but may not then provide rating services
to a consulting services client or consulting services to a
rating services client within one year of providing such
services.
B. Commentary
Modifying Section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act in the above manner
does two things. First, it clarifies that credit rating agencies are no longer
exempt from the provisions of Regulation FD, as originally enacted in
the Dodd-Frank Act. In addition, the proposed change helps close the
loophole currently existing in Regulation FD that permits a person who
owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer, such as an attorney,
investment banker, or accountant, and who expressly agrees to maintain
the disclosed information in confidence to continue to access such
information and use it in publishing credit ratings. The suggested
change still permits credit rating agencies to offer consulting services if
they wish, but forbids them from simultaneously offering consulting and
rating services to the same client. Modifying Section 243.100 addresses
the second half of the needed change:
Part 243—Regulation FD
§ 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its
behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information
regarding that issuer or its securities to any person
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer
shall make public disclosure of that information as
provided in § 243.101(e):
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(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional
disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section, paragraph (a) of this section shall apply to a
disclosure made to any person outside the issuer:
(i) Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with
a broker or dealer, as those terms are defined in Section
3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a));
(ii) Who is an investment adviser, as that term is defined
in Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)); an institutional investment
manager, as that term is defined in Section 13(f)(5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(f)(5)),
that filed a report on Form 13F (17 CFR 249.325) with the
Commission for the most recent quarter ended prior to
the date of the disclosure; or a person associated with
either of the foregoing. For purposes of this paragraph,
a “person associated with an investment adviser or
institutional investment manager” has the meaning set
forth in Section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(17)), assuming for these
purposes that an institutional investment manager is an
investment adviser;
(iii) Who is an investment company, as defined in
Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80a-3), or who would be an investment company
but for Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1)) or Section
3(c)(7) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) thereof, or an affiliated
person of either of the foregoing. For purposes of this
paragraph, “affiliated person” means only those persons
described in Section 2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F)), assuming for these purposes
that a person who would be an investment company but
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for Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1)) or Section 3(c)(7)
(15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) of the Investment Company Act of
1940 is an investment company; or
(iv) Who is a credit rating agency, as that term is defined in
Section 3(a)(60) of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(60)), and the information is intended for any use in
developing, maintaining, or changing a published credit
rating concerning the issuer’s securities; or
(iv) Who is a holder of the issuer's securities, under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that
the person will purchase or sell the issuer's securities on
the basis of the information.
(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a
disclosure made:
(i) To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to
the issuer (such as an attorney, investment banker, or
accountant);
(ii) To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the
disclosed information in confidence;
(iii) In connection with a securities offering registered
under the Securities Act, other than an offering of the
type described in any of Rule 415(a)(1)(i) through (vi)
under the Securities Act (§ 230.415(a)(1)(i) through (vi)
of this chapter) (except an offering of the type described
in Rule 415(a)(1)(i) under the Securities Act
(§ 230.415(a)(1)(i) of this chapter) also involving a
registered offering, whether or not underwritten, for
capital formation purposes for the account of the issuer
(unless the issuer's offering is being registered for the
purpose of evading the requirements of this section)), if
the disclosure is by any of the following means:
(A) A registration statement filed under the Securities
Act, including a prospectus contained therein;
(B) A free writing prospectus used after filing of the
registration statement for the offering or a
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communication falling within the exception to the
definition of prospectus contained in clause (a) of section
2(a)(10) of the Securities Act;
(C) Any other Section 10(b) prospectus;
(D) A notice permitted by Rule 135 under the Securities
Act (§ 230.135 of this chapter);
(E) A communication permitted by Rule 134 under the
Securities Act (§ 230.134 of this chapter); or
(F) An oral communication made in connection with the
registered securities offering after filing of the
registration statement for the offering under the
Securities Act.
C. Commentary
Modifying Section 243.100 in the above manner accomplishes two
goals. First, it prohibits a credit rating agency from accessing material
nonpublic information intended for any use in developing, maintaining,
or changing a published credit rating concerning the issuer’s securities.
Second, it still leaves a credit rating agency the option to access
nonpublic, confidential information should it wish to work with the
issuer on consulting projects as long as the rating agency does not also
provide published credit ratings. The suggested change balances the
need to eliminate abuses in the credit rating industry without unduly
restricting the business opportunities available to the credit rating
agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
As famous presidential advisor Rahm Emanuel urged, the subprime
mortgage debacle is not a crisis to be wasted. For over seventy years, the
credit rating agencies have painted themselves as quasi-regulators, and
their credit rating systems were incorporated into U.S. and international
laws. They were given or permitted to have tremendous power. Yet,
they broke the special and unusual trust that had been placed in them
despite the massive investment losses inflicted on others. Wishing to be
prudent, legislators were careful in the Dodd-Frank Act to move
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relatively slowly.213 In a number of cases, the Dodd-Frank Act only
mandates that either the affected agency or the Government
Accountability Office study the matter and report later with its
recommendations and findings.214 Particularly in light of the large size
of this legislation and the sweeping changes that it proposes, this
cautionary approach should help mitigate negative consequences from
any implemented changes. However, this cautionary approach suffers
from two significant problems: (1) the risk that the abuses of the current
system will continue to occur during the study period, and (2) that the
momentum for change runs out of steam during the study period, and
the opportunity to end shortcomings of the current system is lost in the
face of opposition. Given that many of the mandated changes required
by the Dodd-Frank Act have already missed their congressionally
imposed deadlines, this latter risk appears very real.
Certainly, there is no sense in replacing a broken system with an
even more disastrous one. However, the abuses plaguing the credit
ratings industry and bond market have gone on too long. Definitive
changes need to be made to end the credit rating agencies’ tremendous
power over the financial markets. This Note does not ask for a major
regulatory rewrite with all its accompanying unintended consequences,
but only that the credit rating agencies’ access to confidential
information be eliminated and free market forces be left to work. This
change does not create a new system, but only requires that the credit
rating agencies play by the same rules as other investment analysts who
operate in the financial markets.215 This change is an easy one with farreaching impacts that may eliminate many problems in the credit rating
industry with one stone.
Cheryl Evans

See supra Part III (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For example, Section 939C provides for a three-year deadline for
submission of a study concerning strengthening credit rating agency independence,
including recommendations for improving the integrity of credit ratings issued by
NRSROs. Id. § 939C(c).
215
This approach would essentially mirror the system that is already used in the equity
market.
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